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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EQUAL
TREATMENT PRINCIPLE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
Carsten Thomas Ebenroth * and Ridiger Woggon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the outbreak of the international debt crisis at the beginning
of the 1980s, debtor countries have reached a series of agreements with
private creditor banks, with the aim of reducing the financial strain on
the debtor countries and enabling them to service their debts. Long-
term extensions of maturities are a central aspect of many of these
arrangements. Included in the restructurings are all the medium- and
long-term claims of the creditor banks, often short-term trade credits
and interbank lines, and, in individual cases such as the restructuring
of the debts of Poland, Yugoslavia, Costa Rica, and some African
States, bonds as well.' In addition, the restructuring packages often
include the provision of new credits, in order to maintain, at least for a
time, the liquidity of the debtor countries.
A further characteristic of the arrangements is the introduction of
a series of financial innovations - debt equity swaps, onlending,
relending, and redenomination in currencies other than that of the
original loan, with adaptation to the corresponding market rate of in-
terest - and, particularly very recently, partial remission of debt. 2
And yet, to date little progress has been made in solving the problem
of indebtedness or in enabling the debtor countries to return to the
international financial markets.
Although the countries that are mainly affected, the deeply in-
debted developing countries, naturally continue to depend on a trans-
• Director of the Institute of International Economics and Professor of Law, University of
Konstanz, Federal Republic of Germany. Referendar (J.D.) (1967); MBA (1968); Doktor der
Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. rer. pol.) (1969); Doktor der Rechte (S.J.D.) (1971);
Privatdozent (1974). (Free University Berlin School of Law).
•* Member of the Sonderforschungsbereich (Special Research Unit), "Internalization of the
Economy," at the University of Konstanz, Federal Republic of Germany, Assessor (1987).
1. Mauger, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Practical Background, 2 J. INT'L BANKING L.
100, 111 (1986); Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Parity of Treatment between Equivalent
Creditors in Relation to Comparable Debts, 20 INT'L. LAW. 857 (1986).
2. See Berger, Neue Ansatze im Schuldenmanagement fuir Entwicklungslander, 1988
SPARKASSE 123; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS -
DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 55 (Jan. 1988).
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fer of resources from the industrialized countries, they have, at the
same time, become net exporters of capital.3 Apart from its impact on
the export industries of the industrialized countries, the consequent
drastic reduction in imports hindered the economic adjustment of the
debtor countries. Imports of capital and intermediate goods, which
enter into the domestic production process, had to be curtailed. Since
the developing countries were not able to replace these imported pro-
duction factors with domestic ones, economic growth was hampered.4
Therefore, without debt reduction or new financing, the ability to ser-
vice debts deteriorated further.
The current debt strategy, which is based on the Brady Initiative, a
set of proposals named after the United States Secretary of the Treas-
ury who launched them, consequently requires the creditor banks to
combine debt relief and new credits.5 The banks, however, have not
adopted a uniform policy in deciding which measures should be put
into practice. Their responses depend on a variety of factors. Apart
from varying subjective assessments of future developments in the
debtor countries, the general earnings situation of the creditor banks,
and their long-term interests in particular debtor countries, an impor-
tant role is played, above all, by the differences in the overall legal
framework in their countries of domicile. The banks are subject to
different banking, accounting, and tax regulations, four examples of
which will now be outlined.
A. United States
For U.S. banks, provision against risk is only tax deductible in the
case of country risks within the framework of the officially prescribed
Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves. The body responsible for imple-
mentation is the Interagency Country Exposure Review Committee
(ICERC), which the federal authorities responsible for the supervi-
sion of banks - the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FED), and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) - called into being.6
3. WORLD BANK, I WORLD DEBT TABLES 1989-1990, at 124 (1989).
4. Recent Trends in International Technology Flows and their Implications for Development
Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N. Doc. TDIBI C.6/145 (Aug 18, 1988).
5. Treasury Secretary Brady, Remarks to the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods
Committee Conference on Third World Debt, Washington, D.C., Mar. 13, 1989 reprinted in
Deutsche Bundesbank Ausziige aus Presseartikein Mar. 13, 1989, at 7 [hereinafter Brady]. See
also Mulford, The Ideas for Strengthening the International Debt Strategy, in RESTORING FI-
NANCIAL FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA: COMBINING DEBT REDUCTION WITH THE STIMULA-
TION OF NEW FINANCING 37 (NMB Bank ed. 1989).
6. For a detailed treatment, see Ebenroth & Wolff, Bankaufsichtsrecht und Forderungshandel
mit Umschuldungsldnderkrediten als Auswege aus der Verschuldungskrise, 89 ZErSCHRIFT FOR
Summer 199 11
Michigan Journal of International Law
To date, however, the ICERC has prescribed the creation of such
reserves for claims against only fourteen debtor countries. With the
exception of Argentina and, since June 1990, Brazil, these are all states
with relatively small amounts due to U.S. banks.7 In addition, the
banks are able to create Allowances for Possible Loan Losses (APLL),
which are not tax-deductible. The lack of recognition for tax purposes
makes the creation of these reserves expensive. In terms of capital
requirements that define the ratio of a bank's capital to its assets, the
APLL were included in the definition of regulatory capital up to the
end of 1990.8 A reduction of these reserves as a result of remitting a
claim led, consequently, to a lowering of the lending limit.
Where corresponding reserves have not already been created, the
so-called "ninety-days-rule" has specific financial effects. If the repay-
ment of interest on a loan is overdue for ninety days or more, the
banks must stop accruing interest on the loan; in addition, the past
interest arrears must be deducted from the earnings of the quarter.9
As the costs of cover financing continue to accrue, the classification of
a loan as nonaccrual causes a loss.
On the whole, therefore, the overall legal conditions to which U.S.
banks are subject favor the provision of new credits rather than the
remission of debts. Most banks have, however, increased their room
for maneuvering in recent years by creating allowances for possible
loan losses. For the middle of 1989 the average reserves of the Money
Center Banks were estimated at fifty-eight percent and those of the
regional banks as high as sixty-five percent.10
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 8 (1990); J. WULFKEN, JURISTICHE STRUKTUREN
UND OKONOMISCHE WIRKUNGEN VON DEBT EQUITY SWAPS 74-77 (1989).
7. The states concerned are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, the Sudan, and Zaire. See
J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, THE TAX, ACCOUNTING AND REGULATORY TREATMENT OF SOVER-
EIGN DEBT 24 (Washington D.C. World Bank 1989); Neue US-Bonitiitseinstufungen, NEUE
ZURCHER ZEITUNG -FERNAUSGABE, May 15, 1990, at 14, col. 4; Brazil's Trade Lines "Substan-
dard", INT'L FIN. REV., July 21, 1990, at 25, col. 1.
8. In accordance with the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, only 1.5% of the Al-
lowances for Possible Loan Losses will be included in the regulatory capital beginning in 1991,
and only 1.25% beginning in 1993. See M. CREMER, M6GLICHKEITEN UND GRENZEN PRIVA-
TRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE ALS INSTRUMENT ZUR BEILEGUNG STAATLICHER INSOLVENZ-
KRISEN - NEUE ANSATZE IN DER ENTWICKLUNG EINES INTERNATIONALEN RECHTS DER
STAATSINSOLVENZ 81 (1990); J. HAY & M. BOUCHET supra note 7, at 26.
9. M. CREMER, supra note 8, at 89-90; J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 7, at 19; M.
BOTHE, J. BRINK, C. KIRCHNER & A. STOCKMAYER, RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN
VERSCHULDUNGSKRISE 224 (1988) Baumann & Harvey, LDC Debt Strategies: Accounting and
Tax Issues, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Summer 1989, at 3, 12-13.




Protection against risk is even more difficult in the case of Japanese
banks. Two possibilities have to be distinguished. On the one hand,
for high-risk claims, a fifty percent reserve can be created, which is
recognized for tax purposes and not treated as a part of the regulatory
capital. Originally, it only applied to claims against private debtors,
but it was extended to include sovereign debtors in March 1988. It is a
precondition, however, that a declaration of default has been made or
that no payments whatsoever have been made on the claim in the past
three years."I On the other hand, country risks arising from claims
against third world debtors may be covered by so-called "Reserves for
Specified Overseas Receivables." These reserves were formerly subject
to a limit, which was raised from fifteen percent to twenty-five percent
in January 1990, and not abandoned until June 1990.12 The reserves
are recognized for tax purposes only to the extent of one percent and,
as with the allowances for possible loan losses in the United States,
they were fully included in regulatory capital until the end of 1990.13
A certain degree of relief from these restrictive regulations was
made possible by the foundation of the Japanese Bankers' Investment
Association by twenty-eight Japanese banks in the Cayman Islands in
1987. It was founded with the approval of the Japanese Ministry of
Finance, which in individual cases permits the sale of claims below
nominal value to this corporation, while recognizing the resultant
losses for tax purposes. 14 Consequently, by the middle of 1989, Japa-
nese banks were able to dispose of claims against Brazil, Mexico, and
Argentina with a nominal value of approximately $1.5 billion. It
should be noted, however, that the total of the claims of all Japanese
banks in regard to these three countries alone amounts to approxi-
mately $25 billion. 15 All in all, therefore, Japanese banks' country risk
provision is very slight.
C. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, provision against country risks is organ-
ized on a matrix system, which has been developed by the Bank of
11. See J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 7, at 91-92. As a general rule, however, neither of
these two conditions is met in the case of the Third World claims under consideration here.
12. See Japans Grossbanken erhohen Dritte- Welt-Reserven, Neue-Ziircher Zeitung - Fernaus-
gabe, June 21, 1990, at 12, col. 1.
13. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7, at
92-93.
14. Evans, Japan's Debt and Tax Anomalies, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 89; J. HAY & M.
BOUCHET, supra note 7, at 94.
15. J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 7, at 97.
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England since 1987. It involves an assessment of claims against prob-
lematic debtor countries on the basis of debt restructuring, postpone-
ment of payments, payment policies, and economic situation of the
countries concerned. 16 The revised matrix of January 1990 requires
the creation of reserves, to the amount of fifty percent on average 17,
which are not part of the capital resources.' 8 The matrix is not bind-
ing on the Inland Revenue, the British taxation authority, but the In-
land Revenue does at least accept it as the basis for recognition, for tax
purposes, of sums reserved for medium and long term claims.' 9
In comparison to the United States, therefore, there are more
favorable opportunities to provide against risk and, consequently, to
remit debts. The provision of new credits can, however, be rendered
more difficult by the compulsion to create new reserves for them.
D. Federal Republic of Germany
In Germany there are no concrete guidelines similar to the matrix
of the Bank of England or the prescriptions of the U.S. ICERC for
Allocated Transfer Risk Reserves. Under the terms of commercial
law, with its minimum value principle, write-downs must be made at
the market price or the "estimated value" by revaluating individual
loans as to their future collectibility. 20 Thereby, the banks concerned
have a considerable margin of assessment. 21
This approach via commercial law is accepted for tax purposes in
as far as the amount involved does not fall below the fractional value
as defined by § 6, cap. 1, N 2 Income Tax Code. An important guide
for the determination of the fractional value is provided by two deci-
sions taken by the Financial Court of Hesse in 1982 and 1983.22 In
response to newspaper reports, according to which Poland would not
be able to repay western bank loans in the foreseeable future, a value
adjustment of fifty percent on claims against the Polish state bank,
16. See U. MESSER, RECHTLICHE RAHMENBEDINGUNGEN FOR DIE BETATIGUNG VON
GESCHA.FrSBANKEN IM INTERNATIONALEN FORDERUNGSHANDEL 118-19 (1989); Who's Lead-
ing Who?, INT'L FIN. REV., Feb. 3, 1990, at 20, col. 1; J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 7, at
102.
17. Some examples of the levels are: Argentina 76-89%, Brazil 59-75%, Chile 14-23%, Mex-
ico 24-37%, and Venezuela 38-58%. See Recommended Provisioning Level for UK Banks, INT'L
FIN. REV., Feb. 17, 1990, at 32, col. 2.
18. J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 7, at 102.
19. See U. MESSER, supra note 16, at 123-24; J. HAY & M. BOUCHET, supra note 7, at 107;
Tax Relief Changes, INT'L FIN. REv., March 24, 1990, at 35, col. 3.
20. German Commercial Code, § 253, cap. 3.
21. M. CREMER, supra note 8, at 100.
22. Court order of Aug. 25, 1982, W. Ger., 1983 BETRIEBS BERATER [BB] 228; Judgment of
Sept. 16, 1983, W. Ger., 1984 BB 36.
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Bank Handlowy, was approved. These decisions were accepted by the
financial authorities and now also serve as the basis for the assessment
of other country risks.23 It has been estimated that by the middle of
1989, German banks had in this way created tax deductible reserves
averaging fifty-five percent for their claims against problematic debtor
countries.24
According to § 10, cap.2 Kreditwesengesetz (Banking Act), these
valuation allowances do not form part of the regulatory capital. They
are, however, deducted from the nominal value of the credits ad-
vanced in the assessment of the equity ratio, in accordance with Prin-
ciple 1, cap. 1 of the Principles on Capital Resources and the Liquidity
of Credit Institutes. 25
Thus, German banks are, on the one hand, in a relatively favorable
position to prepare themselves for a reduction in their claims by means
of adequate precautions against risk; on the other hand, because of the
room for maneuvering they have, they are not automatically obliged
when evaluating claims to accept write-downs on new credits.
In spite of the different interests of the creditor banks that neces-
sarily follow from this situation, an attempt has been made in debt
management to date to maintain equal treatment of all creditors. In
order to prevent a "litigation race" between the banks, deviation from
a joint strategy needed to be avoided; until recently there were virtu-
ally no plans to concede preferential treatment to banks that showed
willingness to make an additional contribution to the solution of the
crisis. Instead, the clauses guaranteeing equal treatment of all credi-
tors in the original syndicated loans were in the main accepted and in
part even extended. In what follows, the basic form of the legal meas-
ures adopted to ensure equal treatment will first be outlined (II), and
then the steps that have been taken since 1985, particularly in the most
recent round of debt restructuring, to permit more flexible debt man-
agement will be presented (III).
II. CLAUSES GUARANTEEING EQUAL TREATMENT OF CREDITORS
A. Sharing Clauses
International syndicated credit contracts frequently contain a so-
23. Schobert, Wertberichtigungen auf A uslandsforderungen, insbesondere bei Kreditinstituten,
1986 DIE STEUERLICHE BETRIEBSPROFUNG 73, 76; M. CREMER, supra note 8, at 105.
24. WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 54.
25. Bekanntmachung Nn. 1/69 of the Bundesaufsichtamt fir das Kreditwesen of Jan. 20,
1969 (BAnz. No. 17), most recently modified in the Bekanntmachung of May 15, 1990 (BAnz
No. 92).
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called sharing clause26. This serves to ensure an equal internal distri-
bution of the debtor's payments on interest and principal among all
the banks involved in a particular syndicated credit. This is achieved,
in the first place, by one bank, the so-called agent bank, functioning as
the collecting bank and then passing the funds received on to the other
banks in accordance with their share. This system ceases to function,
however, the moment the debtor breaches the agreement and makes
payments directly to the creditors without concern for equal treatment
of all creditors. Consequently, in its original form, the sharing clause
provided that all those banks that had received a proportionally higher
amount than others must pay the excess amount to the agent bank,
which then ensured a correct distribution. A variant of this, mostly
found in contracts drawn up by American lawyers, does not foresee
redistribution by the agent bank, but instead, obliges the banks having
obtained more than a pro rata repayment to acquire participations
from the other banks. 27
A modification was made in the sharing clause as a result of devel-
opments during the Iran crisis. When, after the fall of the Shah, Iran
failed to meet its commitments to a banking syndicate led by the
Chase Manhattan Bank, some of the U.S. banks satisfied their claims
by setting off their losses against the foreign assets Iran held with
them. They were able to turn down the subsequent sharing request of
the other banks, as no payments had actually been made by Iran.
Since then, sharing clauses not only include payments by the debtor,
but also other methods of compensation; for example, through set-offs,
litigation, or the exercise of liens. 28 In connection with payments of
the debtor made only as a result of legal proceedings, it is sometimes
provided that the sharing bank is not obliged to share if it has in-
formed the other banks of its intention to take legal action, and those
banks have not accepted the invitation to join the litigation.29
In this form the sharing clause was included in debt restructuring
agreements. On one point, however, a change was necessary, as re-
26. The sharing clause from the MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENTS OF 1985 is
reprinted as an example in Appendix I.
27. On the advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement, see Walker & Buchheit, Legal
Issues in the Restructuring of Commercial Bank Loans to Sovereign Borrowers, in SOVEREIGN
LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 139, 144 (1984).
28. See the MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985, at § 5.03(b), infra Appen-
dix I.
29. For details on the development and content of the clause, see Brown, Sharing Strains on
Euromarket Syndicate, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1982, at 4-8; L. HINSCH & N. HORN,
DAS VERTRAGSRECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN KONSORTIALKREDITE UND
PROJEKTFINANZIERUNGEN 167-70 (1985); Youard, Enough is Enough, EUROMONEY, Nov.
1983, at 107; M. CREMER, supra note 8, at 139-150.
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structuring agreements generally involve a series of syndicated and
single credits. Consequently, the tasks of the existing agent banks
have been centralized and transferred to a single bank, usually de-
scribed in the restructuring agreement as the servicing bank. At the
same time, of course, the number of banks among whom the payments
of the debtor are to be redistributed, and the number who might be
affected by the obligation to share, has increased.
There is disagreement among the banks about the significance of a
sharing clause when the debtor does not make payments in the agreed
currency, but secures the acquiescence of single creditor banks in pay-
ment in the local currency, for example, in connection with debt-eq-
uity swaps, debt-for-product swaps, or debt-for-bond swaps. The
contracts do not deal expressly with this question, as there was no
need before the outbreak of the debt crisis. The expression "payment"
used in most of the sharing clauses is not, however, necessarily re-
stricted to the delivery of money, but may also be applied generally to
any kind of performance.30 As the question has not yet been clarified
legally, any bank participating in a debt swap runs the risk of being
required to share if no explicit exception is made in the agreement.3
An important point in connection with set-offs is that every bank
can choose for itself which claims to offset. If, therefore, it has other
claims which are not part of the syndicated credit agreement, it may
offset them without being subject to the sharing requirement. Accord-
ingly, the choice made by a bank is of decisive importance, if it is
involved in several syndicates. 32 It will primarily offset its claims from
that syndicated credit in which it has the largest proportional share in
relation to the other creditors, in this way ensuring that it must remit a
relatively smaller quota.
It is, moreover, customary in the agreements to provide for the
possibility of exemption from the sharing clause, either by means of a
waiver valid only in individual cases or through an amendment to the
agreement. In both cases, however, the agreement of all the creditors
or of a majority of at least ninety percent of the individual banks,
weighted on a pro rata basis, is required. 33
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1016 (5th ed. 1979).
31. See Buchheit & Reisner, The Effect of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Process on Inter-
Creditor Relationships, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 513 (1988); Bouchet & Hay, The Rise of the
Market-Based Menu Approach and its Limitations, in DEALING WITH THE DEBT CRISIS 146, 153
(1989).
32. L. HINSCH & N. HORN, supra note 29, at 169.
33. The unanimity requirement can be found, for example, in the MEXICAN NEW RESTRUC-
TURE AGREEMENT OF 1985, § 13.01(e) and the MEXICAN MULTI-FACILITY AGREEMENT OF
1987, § 14.01 (ii); the VENEZUELAN RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1986, § 15.01(a)(G); the
PHILIPPINES RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1985, § 12.01(d); and the ARGENTINIAN TRADE
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B. Mandatory Prepayment Clauses
An innovation in regard to syndicate credits is the mandatory pre-
payment clause contained in most restructuring agreements. It re-
quires the debtor to make payments before the agreed payment date, if
it repays other creditors not involved in the restructuring package on
or prior to the original payment date.34 It is thus a pendant to the
sharing clause, which only regulates the internal relationship between
the creditor banks involved in a syndicate credit or a restructuring
agreement and has no influence on external creditors.
Two points are of decisive importance here. On the one hand, the
clause is designed to prevent preferential treatment of free riders, those
creditors whose claims (determined primarily according to payment
date, category of debt, and creditor group) were originally meant to be
included in the restructuring agreement, but who refused to partici-
pate. Their right to performance continues to be governed by the orig-
inal contracts and the payment dates agreed within them. The
creditors involved in the rescheduling wish to prevent these non-
cooperative creditors from being treated better than themselves, par-
ticularly as the banks would otherwise rarefy be willing to participate
in the restructuring. An agreement with the debtor that the creditors
who have refused to participate in the restructuring should not be
serviced on the old conditions but only on the conditions accepted by
the majority of the creditors cannot be considered, as the creditors
accepting the restructuring could then possibly face claims for dam-
ages on the grounds of inducing breach of contract."5 For this reason
a different solution is adopted: the debtor is in principle allowed to
service the debts of the noncooperating banks on the old conditions.
But if payments to them exceed the amount fixed in the restructuring
package or are made before the payment date agreed to in it, the
debtor is then required to make payments in the same proportion to
the creditors involved in restructuring.
On the other hand, the mandatory prepayment clause also takes
effect in the case of payments of other debts not intended for inclusion
in the restructuring, if these payments are made earlier than foreseen
by the payments plan scheduled for them. This is due to the fact that
CREDIT AND DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1986, § 12.01(e). In contrast, the approval of
95% of the creditor banks is required by the BRAZILIAN MULTI-YEAR FACILITY AGREEMENT
OF 1988, § 12.01(a)(ii)(A)(v); and the NIGERIAN RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1987, at cl.
54.01.
34. The text of the mandatory prepayment clause from the MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE
AGREEMENT OF 1985 is reprinted in Appendix II.
35. Clark & Hughes, Approaches to the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt, in SOVEREIGN
LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 131, 133 (1984); Clark, supra note 1, at 863.
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the creditors involved in the restructuring, in return for their willing-
ness to make considerable concessions, also wish to profit, at least pro-
portionally, from any unexpected improvement in the liquidity of the
debtor, permitting him to make repayments before the due date.36 For
this reason, the mandatory prepayment clause is also frequently in-
cluded in new credit agreements that are connected with restructuring
agreements. The scope of the clause is usually restricted to payments
in foreign currency. Payments made by the debtor with the assent of
individual creditors in local currency or, for example, in the form of
commodities, are not included. Payments below a certain limit are
also frequently excluded. It is thus possible for the debtor to meet the
claims of banks with a limited commitment that have not participated
in the restructuring, without then being forced to make more substan-
tial payments to the other creditors.
Exemptions are, moreover, possible by means of waivers or by
making appropriate amendments to the agreement. As is customary
with the deferment of payment dates in syndicate credit agreements, 37
however, the requirement of unanimity38 or virtual unanimity39 gener-
ally applies in this case too. In this respect, the Brazilian agreements
are a special case. Although they also require a majority of ninety-five
percent for amendments 4° , claims arising under the clause are auto-
matically triggered only in the event of prepayments to official credi-
tors. Payments to private creditors only lead to corresponding claims
from the creditors involved in the restructuring if it is agreed on by a
majority of over fifty percent. 41
C. Negative Pledge Clauses
1. Content of the Clause
The negative pledge clause regulates the furnishing of security by
the debtor. The syndicated Eurocredits provided for restructuring are
not as a rule secured.42 The only exception is the case of guarantees,
36. Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 31, at 511.
37. L. Hinsch & N. Horn, supra note 29, at 164.
38. See, e.g., the ARGENTINIAN TRADE CREDIT AND DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF
1985, § 12.01(c); the MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985, § 13.01 (C); the
MEXICAN MULTI-FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1987, § 14.01(2)(c); and the VENEZUELAN RE-
STRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1986, § 15.01(a)(c).
39. See the PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1986, § 12.01(a): 90%; the
NIGERIAN RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1987, clause 54.01: 95%.
40. See the BRAZILIAN PARALLEL FINANCING AGREEMENT, § 12.01(a); and the BRAZILIAN
MULTI-YEAR DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1988, § 12.01(a).
41. Id., § 4.02.
42. L. HINSCH & N. HORN, supra note 29, at 102.
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particularly those made by the governments of debtor countries. Such
guarantees, however, provide no protection against difficulties arising
from the lack of foreign currency. In order to ensure the access of the
creditor banks to the assets of the debtor, the creation of securities is
forbidden without exception in the case of Eurocredits and the more
recent restructuring agreements. In section 9.04 (a) of the Mexican
New Restructure Agreement of 1985, for example, the prohibition
runs as follows:
So long as any credit shall remain unpaid, the guarantor will not create
or suffer to exist, nor permit any governmental agency to create or suffer
to exist, any lien, upon or with respect to any of the present or future
properties (including, without limitation, oil, gas and international mon-
etary assets) or revenues of the guarantor or any governmental agency in
each case to secure or provide for payment of external indebtedness, or
any interest or other amount payable in connection therewith, of any
person . . .43
The agreements apply both to the indebtedness of the Mexican
State and to that of other public sector entities for which the State acts
as guarantor. A corresponding prohibition of securities also exists for
the principal debtor in each particular case.44
In this agreement the concept of "lien" is defined as follows:
Lien means any lien, pledge, mortgage, security interest, deed of trust,
charge or other encumbrance on or with respect to, or any preferential
arrangement which has the practical effect of constituting a security in-
terest with respect to the payment of any obligation with or from the
proceeds of, any assets or revenues of any kind.45
An alternative possibility is to permit the creation of securities for
other creditors but to make it a condition that the banks participating
in the restructuring agreement are secured to the same extent. Section
10.01 (c) of the Restructuring Agreement of February 24, 1986, with
Venezuela 46 can serve as an example:
The Republic will ensure that its obligations hereunder will at all times
constitute unconditional general obligations of the Republic, ranking at
all times at least pari passu in priority of payment, in right of security
and in all other respects with all other debt of the Republic now or here-
43. In this particular case, it is also forbidden to transfer future claims arising from the sale
of oil or gas, with the exception of transfers to the Mexican state itself, the Mexican central bank,
the Bank for International Settlements, other multilateral financial authorities, and foreign cen-
tral banks or treasuries. In addition, the receipt of advance payments from the sale of gas and oil
above a limit of $3 billion is also forbidden. The MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT
OF 1985, § 9.04(c).
44. Id., § 9.03.
45. Id., § 1.01.
46. The principal debtor in this agreement is the Republic of Venezuela. Further restructur-
ing agreements were concluded at the same time with debtors of the public sector for whose
indebtedness the State acted as guarantor.
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after outstanding... If any lien... is created to secure the external public
debt, the Republic will cause such lien to equally and ratably secure the
obligations of the public sector restructure obligors under their respec-
tive restructuring agreements and the relending facility agreement.47
Negative pledge clauses were already customary in the original
credit agreements, but their application was restricted to the individ-
ual borrower. In restructuring agreements, the prohibition is fre-
quently extended if states are involved as principle debtors or
guarantors. In such cases, the debtor country must commit itself to
not secure foreign indebtedness from its own assets and, in addition, to
prevent certain other institutions, particularly institutions in the pub-
lic sector which are legally independent of the State, from granting
such securities. The reason for this is the realization of the creditor
banks that the main problem is not the credit risk of individual debt-
ors, but the debtor country's lack of foreign currency. 48 By expanding
the scope of the clause to include all public sector entities or state-
owned enterprises, the lending banks are denied access to the assets or
revenues of these instrumentalities. Otherwise, the debtor state could
try to meet his need for foreign exchange by secured lending chan-
neled through any state-controlled entities. The creditor banks would
be subordinated de facto to the secured lenders, as the debtor country
probably would service the secured debt first, to avoid the expropria-
tion of its assets.
In this respect, there are often quite substantial differences between
agreements. In the clause from the Mexican Restructure Agreement
quoted infra, for example, the prohibition of securities refers to any
"governmental agency." According to the definition in the contract,
this includes not only government agencies, but all enterprises in gen-
eral which belong to or are controlled by the Mexican State.49
The Venezuelan Restructuring Agreement of 1986 contains a dif-
ferent arrangement. The requirement of equal treatment posited in it
refers primarily to the state itself, but, in fact, it enters into force as
soon as any external public debts, i.e. foreign currency indebtedness of
the public sector,50 are secured. A less restrictive regulation can, for
47. The definition of the concept of "lien" corresponds to the example mentioned above from
the MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985.
48. Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 31, at 513-514, Therefore, the negative pledge clause is
generally restricted to indebtedness in foreign currency, as can be seen from the examples quoted.
49. MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985, at § 1.01. An exception is made
only in the case of subsidiaries of Mexican state banks, insofar as they are not financial
institutions.
50. According to this agreement, however, only those institutions listed in article 2 of the
Venezuelan Public Credit Law at the time the agreement was concluded are regarded as part of
the public sector.
Summer 1991]
Michigan Journal of International Law
example, be found in the Brazilian round of restructuring agreements
in 1988. The prohibition of securities envisaged here applies only to
the provision of securities by the Central Bank or the State itself.'
The furnishing of securities for credits by other institutions in the pub-
lic sector is, therefore, possible in principle.
2. Exceptions
In view of the broad interpretation of the concept of "lien," it is
necessary in all cases to permit a series of exceptions. Otherwise, the
severe restrictions on the economic maneuverability of the debtor
would have counterproductive effects. Consequently, the agreements
contain a catalogue of exceptions permitting certain liens. The follow-
ing are typical examples: 52
(a) Liens on properties acquired by debtor states to secure the
purchase price of the properties, or to secure external indebtedness
incurred for the purpose of financing the acquisition of such proper-
ties, or to secure any renewal or extension of the original financing of
the properties.
(b) Liens in favor of lessors to secure claims arising from financial
leases.
(c) Liens for a period not exceeding one year in the course of ordi-
nary commercial transactions.
(d) Liens to finance the production and exportation of goods in as
far as the exportation takes place within one year.
(e) Liens arising in connection with project financing, provided
that they are limited to properties which are the subject of such project
financing or to other properties created in the course of the project.
(f) Liens already in existence when the restructuring or new credit
agreements are concluded.
(g) Liens arising by operation of law.
(h) Liens arising pursuant to orders of attachment, distraint or
similar legal process, provided the lien is released or discharged within
one year.
51. BRAZILIAN MULTI-YEAR DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1988, arts. 8.01(b) and
8.02(b).
52. There is agreement on the provision of all of these exceptions in, for example, the MEXI-
CAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985, § 9.04(a) and the similarly worded § 8.02(a) of
the MEXICAN MULTI-FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1987 (reprinted in Appendix 1II); the VENE-
ZUELAN RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1985, at Schedule X-A; and the BRAZILIAN MULTI-
YEAR DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1988, at Annex F. On the other hand, the ARGEN-
TINIAN TRADE CREDIT AND DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1985, at § 8.03(c), refers spe-
cifically only to exceptions (a), (e)-(g), and (i). In these agreements, however, foreign liabilities
with a maturity of up to one year are excluded entirely from the negative pledge clause.
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(i) Liens in favor of the Bank for International Settlements and
foreign central banks or treasuries to secure credits whose duration
does not exceed one year.5 3
In addition, some agreements permit without qualification the se-
curing of claims up to a certain limit.5 4 A further degree of flexibility
is achieved by permitting other liens if the "majority banks" - a per-
centage of the creditor banks laid down in the agreement and calcu-
lated according to the amount of the outstanding claims in each case
- agree to waive the negative pledge clause."5 In 1988, for example,
the Mexican Government requested such a waiver in connection with
its offer to exchange existing indebtedness for bonds of lower nominal
value which were to be secured by zero bonds of the U.S. Treasury.
The required majority of the creditor banks approved the waiver.56
Exemption by means of waiver is, however, a rather laborious proce-
dure in view of the participation, in some cases, of several hundred
banks in a restructuring agreement. The fact that details of a planned
transaction must be disclosed may also have a deterrent effect.
57
3. Consequences of Breaching Negative Pledge Clauses
As the prohibition of securities in negative pledge clauses is only
contractual, the creation of securities in favor of third parties cannot,
in the final analysis, be prevented. In the event of a breach of contract,
the creditors affected can only have recourse to the sanctions against
the debtor foreseen by the agreement, in particular the termination of
the agreement and the demand for immediate settlement of the out-
standing loan. Such measures would, however, hardly lead to com-
plete reimbursement of the debt, particularly in view of the problems
involved in compulsory enforcement. Consequently, it seems an obvi-
ous step to recover the losses incurred from the third party as the ben-
eficiary of the breach of the contract. If the borrower, bound by the
53. See Bradfield & Jacklin, The Problems Posed by Negative Pledge Covenants in Interna-
tional Loan Agreements, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 131, 134 n.l1 (1984).
54. See, e.g., the VENEZUALAN RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1985, at Schedule X-A
(total of $150 million); the BRAZILIAN MULTI-YEAR DEPOSIT FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1988,
at Annex F ($150 million in 1988, $200 million in 1989, and $250 million in each of the following
years).
55. Of the cases mentioned supra note 33, the agreements with Brazil and Mexico require
over 50% approval, and the agreements with Argentina, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Venezuela
require more than 66 2/3% approval. Changes in the negative pledge clauses can also be made
under these conditions.
56. For details, see Ebenroth & Cremer, Mexikos Umschuldungspaket - Ein Ansatz zur
Ldsung der Schuldenkrise?, DIE BANK, Sept. 1988, at 488, 491; Chamberlin, Gruson &
Weltchek, Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 450-457; see also infra notes 99-
103 and accompanying text.
57. Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 56, at 421.
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contract itself, or the guarantor have furnished security to the third
party, suing for damages under the law of torts can be considered.
In German law, the Civil Code would provide the basis for such
claims.5 8 It is a requirement, however, that the third party has delib-
erately influenced the debtor, inciting him to breach existing contrac-
tual obligations. Moreover, the influence exercised must seem morally
reprehensible. According to the ruling of the German courts and the
dominant legal opinion, however, this is not per se the case with incite-
ment to breach of contract. What is in fact required is an additional
reprehensible factor, a "qualified incitement," for example, a threat, an
offer of special advantage, or an intensive intervention to dispel ex-
isting doubts. 59
An analogue to this requirement can be seen, for example, in the
"tort of interference with contractual relations" in common law,
which, however, takes on different forms in England and the United
States. According to U.S. courts, the requirements are fulfilled if a
third party exerts an intentional and improper influence on the debtor,
thus inducing him to breach of contract. 60 The mere exploitation of
an existing willingness of the debtor to breach the contract is not, how-
ever, in itself sufficient.61
English courts have reduced even further the requirements of this
tort under which claims can be made. It is sufficient under English
law if the third party has knowledge of conflicting contractual obliga-
tions but persists in entering into a contract, thus making a breach
possible. In this case it is of no significance whether the debtor was
willing to breach the contract anyway or whether his willingness was
induced by the third party.62 The granting of a credit involving the
provision by the debtor of securities that are not excluded from the
negative pledge clause would, consequently, be extremely risky for the
creditors, as they could scarcely claim to be ignorant of the contents of
the existing restructuring agreements.
58. BGB § 826.
59. See Schifer in STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH § 826
annot. 171 (12th ed. 1985). Contrary to the view expressed in L. HINSCH & N. HORN, supra note
29, at 105, inducement to breach of a principal covenant is not necessary. This requirement of the
Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of May 20, 1960, W. Ger., 13 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFT 1853, refers only to claims for damages arising exclusively from the law of competition.
Cf. H. MERKEL, DIE NEGATIVKLAUSEL 150 (1985).
60. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 978 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen
5th ed. 1984); Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 31, at 498-99.
61. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 60, at 990.
62. See British Motor Trade Association v. Salvadori, 1949 Ch. 556; D.C. Thomson & Co.
Ltd. v. Deakin, 1952 Ch. 646; Sefton v. Tophams Ltd., 1965 Ch. 1140; for a detailed treatment of
this point and of the De Mattos principle see Cohen-Grabelsky, Interference with Contractual
Relations and Equitable Doctrines, 45 MOD. L. REV. 241, 249-50 (1982).
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If a negative pledge clause does not forbid securities but requires
equality of security, the creditors favored by this arrangement could
enjoy additional protection according to some older decisions of U.S.
courts.63 If the third party accepting a security has knowledge of this
provision, the security granted to it also serves to cover the claims of
the other creditors. In this case, the negative pledge clause establishes
an equitable lien that the secured party and the other creditors have to
share on a pro rata basis. Assuming that the courts would recognize
an equitable lien, it is still, however, doubtful whether a provision re-
quiring equal security would be more advantageous than a general
prohibition of securities, as the measures taken by the debtor to secure
the third party would also have to fall within the scope of U.S. law or
another law that recognizes equitable liens under equivalent
circumstances. 64
4. Scope of the Clause
The restrictions imposed on debtors by the negative pledge clause
provide an incentive to circumvent the clause by means of forms of
financing which formally do not amount to securities, but in fact fulfil
the same economic purpose.65 The following forms can be
considered: 66
- the sale of assets with an obligation to repurchase them at an in-
creased price (sale and repurchase);
- raising funds by selling equipment and the simultaneous agreement
to lease it back from the purchaser (sale and lease-back);
- selling accounts receivable before their due date at a discount to a
third party who retains recourse against the seller in the event of the
seller's customer failing to pay (recourse factoring);67
- the deposit of foreign assets in a blocked account with a creditor,
63. Kaplan v. Chase National Bank, 281 N.Y.S. 825, 156 Misc. 471 (1934); Chase National
Bank v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y.S. 487 (1931), aff'd 236 App. Div. 835, 259 N.Y.S. 1010 (1932), aff'd
261 N.Y. 710, 185 N.E. 803 (1933); Kelly v. Hanover Central Bank and Trust Co., 85 F.2d 61
(2d Cir. 1936). But see Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Gems-by-Gordon, Inc., 649 F.2d 710,
713 (1981).
64. According to a debatable decision of the California Supreme Court, Coast Bank v. Min-
derhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), a straightforward prohibition of security can
be regarded as an equitable lien. On this point, see D. MOHL, RECHT DER KREDIT-
SICHERHEITEN IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA, TEIL I: IMMOBILIAR-
SICHERHEITEN UND PERSONLICHE SICHERHEITEN 40 (1985).
65. See Walker & Buchheit, supra note 27, at 147; Ebenroth, Finanzinnovationen im LDC-
Merchant Banking, in BANKBETRIEB UND EIGENKAPITALFINANZIERUNG, AKTUELLE RECHT-
SFRAGEN 119, 140-41 (B. Liithje ed. 1990).
66. See 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BANKING LAW para. F (3410) (P. Cresswell, W. Blair, G.
Hill, & P. Wood eds. 1991).
67. In practice, there are doubts about the acceptability of recourse factoring as a form of
financing that evades the negative pledge clause. See the case presented in Ebenroth, supra note
65, at 141.
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enabling it offset against a claim.68
According to U.S. and English common law, 6 9 there is no security
interest in these cases. 70 There are, however, a number of arguments
in favor of a broader interpretation of the negative pledge clause. First
of all, the purpose of the clause must be taken into account. 71 The
debtor should not be permitted to evade enforcement of claims by
creditor banks by granting individual creditors preferential access to
its assets. What matters to the parties concerned is not the legal form,
but the economic significance of a transaction. Furthermore, Section 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)72, for example, assumes that
in answering the question whether a security interest exists, the goal
pursued by the participants is of primary importance. 73 Consequently,
whether or not contractual arrangements that do not contain a secur-
ity interest according to common law may, nevertheless, be treated as
secured transactions, depends on the economic motives of the parties.
Moreover, in section 1-201 (37) of the UCC, the circumstances under
which a leasing contract may be seen as creating a security is regulated
in detail.
On the other hand, in the interpretation of contracts under Anglo-
American law, great importance is attached to the wording of the con-
tract.74 In the situation under discussion, this is justifiable to a partic-
ularly high degree, as outside third parties, such as potential business
partners of the debtor, could be affected by the clause. If, therefore,
the definition of "lien" laid down in the contract is restricted essen-
tially to a list of the security interests possible and recognized under
common law, without, for example, referring to the UCC, with its
broader understanding of the security interest, then the negative
68. This only makes sense, however, in the case of credits not involving syndicates, as the
sharing clause would otherwise apply.
69. Most syndicated loans to developing countries and restructuring agreements are subject
to New York state law; a few are subject to English law. Other legal systems play virtually no
part. See Stoakes, The Lawyer and Rescheduling, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1984, at 275; L. HINSCH &
N. HORN, supra note 29, at 152.
70. 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BANKING LAW, supra note 66, at para. F (3410), (3554); R.
GOODE, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CREDIT AND SECURITY 173 (2d ed. 1988). This, however, may
not be true if permission to offset is provided for in a contract. See Pergam, The Borrower's
Perspective on Euroloan Documentation, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1983, at 14, 15; P. WOOD,
ENGLISH AND INTERNATIONAL SET-OFF, para. 5-185 (1989).
71. Walker & Buchheit, supra note 27, at 139, 147.
72. The UCC, a model law that has been adopted (with variations) by all of the U.S. states
but Louisiana, regulates most aspects of secured transactions, except personal and real estate
securities.
73. See 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BANKING LAW, supra note 66, para. F (3410); Sierra Finan-
cial Corporation v. Brooks-Farrer Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 698, 93 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1971).
74. 2 K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTZ, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM
GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS (2d ed. 1984).
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pledge clause should be interpreted more strictly. In order to dispel
any doubts that might arise, every agreement which de facto has the
effect of a security is regularly included in the definition of a "lien, ' 75
as in the examples listed above in II.C.3. In the final analysis, however,
there is no foolproof way of preventing transactions that evade the
clause, if only because the creditor banks do not have the necessary
means of control at their disposal. 76
D. Pari Passu Clauses
While the negative pledge clause is designed to prevent preferential
treatment of other creditors through the provision of securities, the so-
called pari passu clause aims at avoiding the subordination of the lend-
ing banks to other unsecured indebtedness. A typical clause runs as
follows:
So long as any credit shall remain unpaid, the obligor will ensure at all
times that its obligations hereunder constitute its unconditional general
obligation ranking at least pai passu with all of its other unsecured ex-
ternal indebtedness now or hereafter outstanding. 77
The clause is commonly found in loan contracts with private borrow-
ers and is intended to prevent the accordance of priority to individual
unsecured creditors in the event of the debtor's insolvency. 78
In dealings with sovereign debtors, which cannot be liquidated like
a corporation or subjected to bankruptcy proceedings, the clause
serves the purpose of preventing the debtor from pursuing measures
that create different classes of creditors. At issue here are legal regula-
tions of the debtor country which would require it to use the foreign
currency primarily to satisfy particular creditors, 79 for example, in
favor of the International Monetary Fund, in order not to endanger
membership in this organization, or to benefit those banks that are
willing to provide fresh money. The earmarking of certain sources of
hard currency earnings for the servicing of particular debts is also
inadmissible.80
75. Pergam, supra note 70, at 15.
76. P. WOOD, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE § 6.02(2)(d) (1989).
77. The PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF 1986, § 8.01(d). Insofar as it is not
itself the principal debtor, the Philippine State acts as guarantor and commits itself to the corre-
sponding pari passu obligations. See also the VENEZUELAN RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF
1986, at § 10.01, which includes a negative pledge covenant in the form of a guarantee of equal
security.
78. P. WOOD, supra note 76, § 6.03(2); Semkow, Syndicating and Rescheduling International
Transactions. A Survey of the Legal Issues Encountered by Commercial Banks, 18 INT'L LAW.
869, 899 (1984).
79. 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BANKING LAW, supra note 66, paras. F (3418), F (3450); P.
WOOD, supra note 76, § 6.03(3).
80. Semkow, supra note 78, at 869, 899.
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Differentiation between creditors is nevertheless possible in a
number of other areas: sovereign debtors may exclude creditors who
have not taken part in restructuring or new credit agreements from
participating in debt-equity swap programs, with the result that their
claims can in practice no longer be traded on the secondary market.8t
Banks are further treated unequally when individual creditors profit
from securities granted by third parties which do not, consequently,
fall under the negative pledge clause. 82 Also relevant are the commit-
ments of debtor countries to selected groups of creditors, excluding
them from future restructurings and demands for new credits ("exit
option"). This means that their claims are accorded priority if the
debtor country is prevented by lack of foreign currency from servicing
the debt or if it is not in a position to meet the entire foreign debt.
Such a commitment was made, for example, by the Mexican govern-
ment in favor of those creditors who, at the beginning of 1988, ac-
cepted the offer to exchange existing claims for bonds with a lower
nominal value. 83
Finally, the decision as to which claims are to be included in a
restructuring package and which are to be serviced in accordance with
the original agreement involves in itself a segmentation of the credi-
tors. As pointed out in the introduction, claims with a duration of less
than a year and bonds are not usually included in restructuring agree-
ments. But there are also differences in the treatment of private and
public creditors. Although the commercial banks and the bilateral
creditors represented in the Paris Club are concerned with ensuring
that their restructuring rounds are accompanied by corresponding
measures of the other groups, 4 the conditions agreed on in the re-
structuring packages are by no means identical. Striking examples are
provided by the recent Mexican and Philippine Restructuring Agree-
ments, which resulted in a partial remission of debts by the banks
without any provision for a similar remission on the part of foreign
states. 85 The multilateral institutions, the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, have been exempted from any restructuring
81. See Buchheit, Unseating Free Riders, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1989, at 14, 15; M.
CREMER, supra note 8, at 165.
82. In the case of the MEXICAN MULTI-FACILITY AGREEMENT OF 1987, for example, facili-
ties II and III were in part guaranteed by the World Bank.
83. On this point, see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
84. Clark, supra note 1, at 860; M. BOTHE, J. BRINK, C. KIRCHNER & A. STOCKMAYER,
supra note 9, at 162.
85. The Mulford Interview: No Brady Plan II - Official, INT'L FIN. REV., March 24, 1990, at
4, col. 1. A severe criticism of this differentiation by the commercial banks can be found in Kritik
an zunehmend ungleichm'ssiger Behandlung und Skepsis tiber Brady-Plan, HANDELSBLATT,
May 7, 1990, at 15, col. 1.
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of their claims.8 6
What all of these possible forms of differential treatment have in
common is that they have no influence on the maintenance of claims
or on their legal enforceability. Accordingly, no formal priorities be-
tween different claims are established. Only a formal segmentation
could, however, be regarded as a breach of the pari passu clause. 87
Exemptions from the pari passu clause are also possible, provided
that the majority banks agree to them.88 In any event, the clause has
not achieved any practical significance in the management of restruc-
turings to date.
III. EFFECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LIMITING THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT
The establishment of equal treatment for all creditors occurred in
the first phase of debt management, which successfully achieved its
purpose, the prevention of the collapse of the international financial
markets. However, it also impeded a solution of the debt crisis by
means of the menu approach. 89 As a result, the deeply indebted devel-
oping countries are still by and large excluded from the credit markets,
although they continue to be in need of financing. Their lack of credit-
ability prevents the provision of unsecured credits and the negative
pledge clause prevents the provision of securities. Bank credits to fi-
nance the balance of payments, other no-purpose loans, and credits to
finance necessary infrastructural improvements or to refinance the
servicing of debts cannot, therefore, be secured.
Even where exceptions to the negative pledge clause are permitted,
these may be inadequate. For example, the first exception listed in the
catalogue presented above (II.B. 1.) permits liens to secure the
purchase price of properties or credits acquired in connection with im-
ports. Only the acquired goods themselves can, however, serve as se-
curity. But these are not a satisfactory form of security, as they are
usually situated in the debtor country after their acquisition.
86. Clark, supra note 1, at 859; M. BOTHE, J. BRINK, C. KIRCHNER, & A. STOCKMAYER,
supra note 9, at 157.
87. See Walker & Buchheit, supra note 27, at 146; Buchheit & Reisner, supra note 31, at 497;
P. WOOD, supra note 76, § 6.03(3); 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BANKING LAW, supra note 66, paras.
F (3418), F (3450).
88. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The NIGERIAN RESTRUCTURING AGREE-
MENT is an extreme case, in that a change in the pari passu clause is made dependent upon the
approval of 95% of the banks, weighted according to the degree of participation. See the RE-
STRUCTURING AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23, 1987, cl. 25.01 and 54.01.
89. Ebenroth, The Changing Legal Framework for Resolving the Debt Crisis: A European's
Perspective, 23 INT'L LAW. 629, 638 (1989).
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It is, therefore, questionable whether the negative pledge clause
serves its purpose. When the situation is most critical, it can prevent
the acquisition of the means needed for adjustment without ultimately
guaranteeing a satisfaction of the demands of the creditors it is
designed to protect. 9°
The clauses described above can also lead to problems in connec-
tion with the remission of debt. For banks willing to forego a part of
their claims there must be incentives offering them advantages over
other creditors in return for the renunciation of their claims. The pro-
vision of security for the remaining claims could be considered. But
this would violate the negative pledge clause. The immediate satisfac-
tion of the remaining claims, prior to maturity and with a discount on
nominal value, could also be taken into consideration. But in this case
the sharing clause would come into effect, requiring the creditor who
has foregone part of his claims to share the payments with other credi-
tors, and requiring the debtor to observe the mandatory prepayment
clause and make corresponding payments to other syndicates or to the
creditors involved in other restructuring agreements. 91
The sharing clause also has a negative effect on endeavors to com-
plement restructurings by means of new money packages. The free
riders, who do not take part in this involuntary lending, thus profit
from the willingness of the other banks to refinance the servicing of the
old stock by providing new funds.
The negative effects of the equal treatment clauses are also taken
into account in the Brady Initiative of March 1989. It calls for a gen-
eral waiver of sharing and negative pledge clauses for a certain period
of time, for example three years, in order to enable agreements on the
voluntary remission of debt to be reached.92
A. Modifications in the Equal Treatment Principle to 1988.
1. Qualified Capital Stock
Even before the Brady Initiative, modifications in the clauses guar-
anteeing equal treatment were introduced in a series of financing pack-
ages with the aim of reducing the amount of foreign debt by means of
90. McDaniel, Are Negative Pledge Clauses in Public Debt Issues Obsolete?, 38 Bus. LAW.
867, 879 (1983). Cf Clark, supra note 1, at 864-65 (provision of security facilitates restructuring
with new money).
91. On debt buy-backs that evade the sharing and mandatory prepayment clauses, see
Ebenroth, supra note 65, at 143; Third World Debt Traders: The Unsolved Mystery, Fin. Times,
Dec. 19, 1989, at 29, col. 3.
92. Brady, supra note 5, at 9.
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debt-equity swap programs.93 Section 5.11 of the Mexican Restructur-
ing Agreements of 1985 is an example.94 The arrangement contains an
exception to the sharing and mandatory prepayment clauses and per-
mits an exchange of the claims arising under the agreement for equity
interests in private or public enterprises, referred to as "qualified capi-
tal stock." A number of restrictions are, however, foreseen. 95 For ex-
ample, only foreigners are permitted to acquire such interests and a
transfer to Mexican investors is only possible after 1997. Further-
more, the investor cannot be granted any claim to repayments of any
kind before the due date of the debt exchanged. A conversion also
requires the approval of the relevant Mexican authorities in accord-
ance with Mexican domestic law.
In subsequent years, comparable arrangements were also included
in agreements with other countries, although the form was sometimes
substantially changed. Section 5.11 of the Philippine Restructuring
Agreement of 1986, for example, does not require direct conversion
into equity interests but permits repayment of a credit in local cur-
rency, provided the creditor bank agrees. Conversion is possible not
only for foreign creditors but also for Philippine citizens who may
have acquired claims on the secondary market. To what extent, if at
all, and under what conditions the payments received must be invested
in Philippine enterprises depends entirely on internal Philippine
regulations. 96
According to estimates, however, the foreign debt of all developing
countries could only be reduced by about $20 billion in this way, the
total volume of debt being $1.3 trillion.97 But the situation is consider-
ably more favorable for certain debtor countries. , One of these is
Chile, whose debts were reduced by more than $5 billion between 1985
and August 1989.98
93. The countries concerned were, in particular, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecua-
dor, Mexico, the Philippines, and Venezuela. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY Fund, supra note
2, at 58.
94. The modified, 1987 version of § 5.11 is reprinted in Appendix IV.
95. For details, see Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, supra note 56, at 422-23; J. WULFKEN,
supra note 6, at 130-35; Mudge, Mexico Leads the Way, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1988, at 25, 28.
96. See Ebenroth & Roth, Konversionsfdndsfur die Philippinen, 87 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VER-
GLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHOFT [ZVGLRWISS] 393 (1988); Ebenroth & Biihler,
Schuldenkon version auf den Philippinen - Neuere Entwicklung und Probleme, 88 ZVGLRWIsS.
302 (1989).
97. Cooke, Salvaging Debt Equity Swaps, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1989, at 149. For
the reasons, see C. EBENROTH, GLOBALE .HERAUSFORDERUNGEN DURCH DIE
VERSCHULDUNGSKRISE 23 (1987).
98. Carey, Leventhal, & Irvine, Chile's Debt-for-Equity Programme: Hotter than Most?,
INT'L. FIN. L. REV., Feb. 1990, at 28, 31.
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2. Qualified Investments/Qualified Debts
There was an extension of the debt-equity swap clauses in many of
the agreements in 1987 and 1988. First of all, in section 5.11 of the
restructuring and new credit agreements with Mexico,99 the exchange
of claims for "qualified investments" and "qualified debts" was ex-
cluded from the sharing and mandatory prepayment clauses. The
term "qualified investment" in the 1987 agreement with Mexico ap-
plies to the repayment of indebtedness to Mexican banks or trusts in
Mexican pesos, the acquisition of capital assets in Mexico, and other
capital expenditures. This kind of conversion is, moreover, open only
to "Mexican persons," i.e., Mexican citizens and enterprises with their
principal places of business in Mexico. t°° This newly introduced ex-
ception is aimed, therefore, at the repatriation of flight capital. For
such an exchange, the approval of the appropriate Mexican authorities
is also required.
Whereas qualified investments involve, in essence, an extension of
the debt-equity swap clause to include Mexican persons, the possibility
of conversion into "qualified debt" presents a fundamental innovation.
According to this procedure, it is permissible to convert existing in-
debtedness into new debts which either have a longer maturity than
the previous credits or are offered to all banks pro rata, that is, in
shares corresponding to the amount of their claims. 101 This possibility
was taken up for the first time at the beginning of 1988. Mexico of-
fered all foreign creditor banks the exchange of existing claims for
newly issued registered bonds with a lower nominal value, which was
to be fixed by auction, at a variable rate of interest. 0 2 The bonds will
be due for repayment in 2008, whereas the existing restructuring and
credit agreements run to 2006 at the latest. The preconditions for
qualified debt were thus fulfilled and, consequently, the bonds are not
subject to the Mexican sharing and mandatory prepayment clauses.
In order to create an incentive for the acceptance of the exchange
offer, Mexico also arranged to secure the principal by pledging zero
bonds of the U.S. Treasury. To this end a waiver of the negative
pledge clause was necessary, and it was in fact conceded by the major-
ity banks - in the case of Mexico, fifty percent of the banks involved.
If no exception had been made for qualified debts, a waiver of the
sharing clause would also have been necessary. According to the
99. Reprinted in Appendix IV.
100. Chamberlin, Gruson, & Weitchek, supra note 56, at 423.
101. Id. at 453.
102. Ebenroth & Cremer, supra note 56, at 490; Chamberlin, Gruson, & Weitchek, supra
note 56, at 450.
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terms of the Mexican Agreement, this would have required the ap-
proval of all the creditor banks.
Further regulations on qualified debt, comparable to section 5.11
of the Mexican Agreement, were included in agreements with Brazil,
Ecuador, the Philippines, and Venezuela, among others.10 3
3. Debt Buy-Backs
In 1988 Bolivia and Chile were able to repurchase a portion of
their foreign debt at a discount with the approval of the creditor
banks. The distaste of the banks for debt buy-backs involving a dis-
count on the nominal value is based primarily on the fact that in such
transactions the currency reserves are withdrawn from debt servicing.
Furthermore, the debtors can influence prices on the secondary mar-
ket by their behavior in regard to payments. If debt buy-backs were
possible, the debtors would have good reason to force prices down by
refusing to pay. 04 In the case of Bolivia, however, a donation from an
unknown party was involved. The creditor banks agreed to the use of
this donation in the debt buy-back under the control of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. In this way Bolivia's indebtedness was re-
duced by $253 million.'05
Although the circumstances were not so unusual in the case of
Chile, there too the creditor banks agreed to debt buy-backs by chang-
ing the existing agreements. The amount to be used by Chile, how-
ever, was restricted to a maximum of $500 million.1°6
B. Restructurings Under the Brady Initiative
Since the proposals of the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury were pub-
lished, the Philippines and Mexico, in particular, have concluded re-
structuring agreements with their creditor banks. 0 7
103. Chamberlin, Gruson, & Weltchek, supra note 56, at 423.
104. In the international debt crisis of the 1930s, in contrast to today's syndicated loan agree-
ments, repurchasing defaulted bonds at market prices was not precluded by sharing, mandatory
prepayment, or other clauses. Debt buy-backs became a commonly used measure for debtor
countries to reduce their foreign debt. See B. EICHENGREEN & R. PORTES, SETTLING DEFAULTS
IN THE ERA OF BOND FINANCE 23-25 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper
No. 272, 1988).
105. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 2, at 63; INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS - DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS, April
1989, at 39.
106. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 105, at 40.
107. Further Brady plan restructurings, concerning Costa Rica, Venezuela and Uruguay, use
elements similar to those found in the new Mexican and Philippine agreements.
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1. The Philippine Restructuring Agreement of 1989-90
The Philippine package, negotiated at the end of 1989, saw
changes in all clauses guaranteeing equal treatment, with the excep-
tion of the pari passu clause. 10 8 The legally relevant modifications can
be sketched as follows.
Following the waiver of the sharing, mandatory prepayment, and
negative pledge clauses, it is permissible, over and above the arrange-
ments made in 1987 for qualified debts, to engage in any transactions
up to a maximum value of $1.5 billion that serve the purpose of reduc-
ing the indebtedness or the burden of interest (eligible debt reduction
and eligible debt service reduction transactions). 109 The funds used
for this purpose must stem from official foreign sources, for example,
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or foreign govern-
ments. Once these funds are exhausted, however, at the latest by Jan-
uary 1, 1992, these measures to reduce indebtedness may only be
continued to the amount of $300 million annually. The Philippines
may then, however, fall back on its own currency reserves."10
To facilitate the implementation of this debt reduction, the creditor
banks have agreed to a further exception to the principle of equal
treatment. The contracts do provide for a pro rata limitation, accord-
ing to which the offers made by the Philippines concerning debt reduc-
tion and debt service reduction transactions must be made on a pro
rata basis to all banks involved in the restructuring agreement or the
new credit agreement. However, the Philippines may dispose freely of
up to $150 million each calendar year regardless of this limitation."'
An additional exception to the negative pledge clause" 1 2 also serves
to facilitate the borrowing of new credits. According to this regula-
tion, the Philippines can provide liens up to a total of $200 million for
new credits. 113
108. To change the sharing clause, the approval of all the creditor banks was required; to
change the mandatory prepayment and the negative pledge clauses, quotas of over 90% and 66
2/3% respectively, weighted pro rata, were sufficient. See the PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING
AGREEMENT OF 1986, at § 12.01.
109. The SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT, parts
A4, A5, and A6; the SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE CREDIT AGREEMENT, parts
A5, A6, and A8.
110. The SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT, part
A2 and The SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE CREDIT AGREEMENT, part A2: "Avail-
able Debt Reduction Resources".
11l. The SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT, part
A2; the SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE CREDIT AGREEMENT, part A2: "pro rata
limitations".
112. The SECOND. AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT, part
A6; the SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE CREDIT AGREEMENT, part A8.
113. See the SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE RESTRUCTURING AGREEMENT,
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A special feature of the Philippine package is, moreover, the fact
that it relies upon voluntary participation of the creditor banks in re-
gard to both debt reduction and new money loans. Consequently,
each bank may also choose not to participate in this package. 114
The first of the measures taken by the Philippines in the course of
changing the conditions of the agreements was a substantial debt buy-
back. In this way the foreign debt was reduced by about $1.3 billion,
with a large number of the banks terminating their commitments in
the process. I5
2. The Mexican Restructuring of 1989-90
a. The Structure of the Package
In contrast to the Philippine package, the restructuring and new
credit agreements between Mexico and its creditor banks, which were
negotiated in the summer of 1989 and signed in February 1990, pro-
vide that all banks whose claims were intended for inclusion in the
new arrangement' 1 6 should participate in at least one of the options
offered - debt reduction (Options I and II) or fresh money in the
form of new money loans and bonds (Options III-VI).
The first option involves an exchange of existing claims for Mexi-
can bonds at only sixty-five percent of the nominal value of the ex-
changed debts and a variable rate of interest of thirteen to sixteen
percent over LIBOR (floating rate discount bonds). Option II enables
the banks to exchange their claims for Mexican bonds at the nominal
value of the existing debts, but with a fixed rate of interest of only six
and a quarter percent" 7 (fixed rate par bonds).
Both kinds of bonds are registered securities with a maturity of
thirty years. In regard to the principal they are secured to the full
part A2; see also the SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE PHILIPPINE CREDIT AGREEMENT, part A2:
"Eligible Collateralized New Money Transactions".
114. For a detailed examination of the conditions of this package, see Ebenroth & Biihler,
Die Implementierung der Brady-Intitiative in Mexiko und den Philippinen, 1990 RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 23, 26-28.
115. See Ebenroth & Biihler, supra note 114 at 27; Philippines Finalises Debt Buy-back, Fin.
Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at 22, col. 4.
116. MEXICAN 1989-92 NEW CREDIT AGREEMENT OF 1990; MEXICAN NEW MONEY
BOND RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1990. The package includes the lion's share of Mexico's
medium and long-term debts with private creditor banks, the total amounting to over $48 billion.
A Modest Deal for Mexico, Financial Times, Jan. 17, 1990, at 18; Bad Press Throws a Shadow
Over Mexico Deal, INT'L FINANCING REV., Jan. 27, 1990, at 28.
117. WORLD BANK, I WORLD DEBT TABLES 1990-1991, at 78-81 (1990). This rate applies
only to bonds denominated in U.S. dollars. For bonds in other currencies it varies between
3.75% (Swiss francs) and 10.75% (Italian lire). MEXICAN DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND Ex-
CHANGE AGREEMENT OF 1990, Annex A to Exhibit IA, at 8.
Summer 1991]
Michigan Journal of International Law
amount by the pledging of U.S. zero bonds;"1 8 in regard to interest
they are partially secured by a revolving interest guarantee for a period
of eighteen to twenty-four months. For this purpose a waiver of the
majority banks involved in the old agreements was necessary.' 1 9 And
yet, because the maturity was longer than that of the previous claims,
these bonds were qualified debt in the sense determined by section 5.11
of the existing agreements. Consequently, they no longer fall under
the sharing and mandatory prepayment clauses. Furthermore, these
bonds also take the form of exit bonds, as Mexico has committed itself
to excluding them from any future restructurings or new money
requests. 120
The other four options contain different kinds of fresh money com-
mitments amounting to twenty-five percent of the previous commit-
ments of the banks involved. The outstanding claims of the banks that
decided in favor of one of these options remain unchanged in regard to
both the principal amount and the rate of interest.1 21
Whereas those banks which have decided in favor of discount or
par bond swaps are free from sharing obligations towards other credi-
tors because of the longer maturity of the bonds, this is problematic in
the case of those providing fresh money. As they were meant to retain
their old claims, those creditors would have had to share all payments
from Mexico with the "free riders," i.e., those banks that were not
willing to accept either a reduction of the debt or the provision of new
funds and refused to participate in the new Mexican package. In view
of the problems with these free riders, many banks could probably not
have been persuaded to take part in the restructuring. In order to
create an incentive for them to participate, therefore, the old agree-
ments were not simply taken over unchanged, but were replaced by
new credit agreements with the same principal amounts, rates of inter-
est, and maturity. This novation was the obvious path to take, as the
sharing clause is only operative among the creditors participating in a
specific agreement. 22
It is, in principle, doubtful whether the contractual obligations to-
118. This again applies only to bonds in U.S. dollars. MEXICAN DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND
EXCHANGE AGREEMENT OF 1990, Exhibit IB, at 15. DM bonds are collateralized, for example,
by means of a 30-year, zero coupon bond of the German Post Office. Id. at Exhibit I B. See
UNITED MEXICAN STATES COLLATERIZED 5.01% DEUTSCHE MARK BONDS AGREEMENT OF
1990-2019, at § 8(1).
119. More than 50% of the creditor banks, weighted according to the amount of the claims
outstanding. Cf supra note 55.
120. MEXICAN DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT OF 1990, supra note
117, at § 5.01(b).
121. For details on the individual options, see Ebenroth & Biihler, supra note 114, at 24.
122. See infra II.A.
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ward other members of a syndicate can be evaded simply by nova-
tion, 23 especially as changes in the sharing clauses of the Mexican
agreements require unanimity.1 24 Accordingly, it is also regarded as
possible that the nonparticipating banks will try to enforce in the
courts claims arising from the sharing clause.' 25 The novation is,
however, covered by section 5.11 of the Mexican agreements. Ac-
cording to this clause, qualified debt includes not only the exchange of
old for new indebtedness with a longer maturity, but also each and
every conversion offered to all the creditors on a pro rata basis. 126 The
procedure adopted in Mexico meets this requirement. All of the op-
tions proposed - including the twenty-five percent fresh money com-
mitment, which involved a novation of the old indebtedness - were
offered equally to all creditors. This increases the risk for the free
riders that they may fail completely to vindicate their claims.' 27
b. Equal Treatment Clauses
The Mexico package also limits the application of the sharing,
mandatory prepayment, and negative pledge clauses. The regulations
differ, however, from option to option.
(i) Sharing Clauses
The sharing clause was abandoned completely for the three groups
of bonds (discount, par, and new money bonds). Payments on these
bonds before maturity are, however, subject to restrictions. Mexico
can, for example, make use of a call option to redeem the bonds prior
to maturity. But if the redemption is only partial, it must take all the
creditors into account on a pro rata basis. 128 It is also permissible to
buy back the bonds, in which case Mexico is subject to no restrictions
in the choice of the creditors to whom repayment is offered. 129 For
buying back discount and par bonds, however, it is a condition that
Mexico must not be in arrears with the payment of interest and that
the revolving security on interest is completely guaranteed. This sec-
ond condition ceases to apply as soon as the commercial bank bridge
123. Bouchet & Hay, supra note 31, at 150.
124. See sources cited supra note 33.
125. WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 52.
126. See infra III.A.2.
127. Very few of the more than 400 creditor banks have, consequently, refused to participate
in the new Mexican package.
128. See MEXICAN DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT OF 1990, Exhibit I
A, at 14; MEXICAN NEW MONEY BOND SUBSCRIPrION AGREEMENT OF 1990, Exhibit I, at 9.
129. Id.
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facilityl 30 has been repaid, but at the earliest by January 1, 1995.131
At a later date the buying back of discount and par bonds from any
creditors is permissible provided that there are no interest payments
outstanding.
In the other agreements - that is, the new credit agreements 132
(with the exception of the New Money Bond Subscription Agreement)
and the agreements which form part of the novation replacing the ex-
isting agreements - the sharing clause is retained but two further ex-
ceptions are added. On the one hand, a new section 5.12 permits a
buy-back of debts prior to maturity, with Mexico required to offer the
buy-back to all the creditors participating in the agreement. The sum
of permissible debt buy-backs per calendar year is limited to a maxi-
mum calculated on the basis of currency reserves, expenditures on im-
ports, current interest payments, and the new credits to be granted to
Mexico in the future. 33
On the other hand, the concept of "qualified debt" in section 5.11
was extended. Previously, this had accorded a privileged position only
to conversions that involved an exchange of existing debts for new in-
debtedness with a longer maturity or that were offered to all the credi-
tors on a pro rata basis. 34 A third variant was now added permitting
exchanges for new debt with a shorter maturity than the older indebt-
edness, provided they went hand in hand with a sufficient remission of
debt in Mexico's favor. In order to calculate this amount, section 5.11
contains a detailed formula according to which the length of maturity
can be shorter, if the the amount of remission accepted by the creditor
is higher.'3 5
(ii) Mandatory Prepayment Clause
The mandatory prepayment clause was not included in the agree-
ments on the three different types of bonds. This means that Mexico's
payments on other debts before the due date originally fixed for these
130. A $1.2 billion package granted by a group of commercial banks - in addition to funds
extended by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Japanese Export-Import
Bank - for the purpose of financing the collateral of the bonds.
131. MEXICAN DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT OF 1990, Exhibit I A,
at 15.
132. The MEXICAN 1989-1992 CREDIT AGREEMENT OF 1990; The MEXICAN ONLENDING
AND TRADE CREDIT AGREEMENT OF 1990.
133. See the MEXICAN COMBINED OLD NEW MONEY AGREEMENT OF 1990, §§ 5.12 and
8.02, reprinted in Appendix V.
134. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.




agreements and payments to free riders who have not participated in
the financing package have no effect on the claims of the bondholders.
The clause is inserted in the new credit agreements. It takes effect,
however, only in the event of payments prior to maturity on claims of
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other public
creditors. 13 6
The mandatory prepayment clause in the then-customary form,
i.e., also dealing with payments to other private creditors, was in-
cluded in those agreements that replaced the old agreements of credi-
tors providing fresh money.137 In this case, conversions in accordance
with section 5.11 and debt buy-backs in accordance with section 5.12
of the original Mexican Agreements were excluded from the sphere of
operation of the clause.
(iii) Negative Pledge Clause
In all agreements apart from the New Money Bond Agreements,
the furnishing of securities to third parties continues to be forbid-
den.' 38 The catalogue of exceptions valid up to that time' 39 was, how-
ever, extended to include some further cases.14 The following are to
be permitted: 141
(a) securities in favor of the discount and par bond creditors and
- to an equal extent - securities on other existing loans and new
indebtedness entered into by Mexico in connection with debt
conversions;
(b) liens on cash on hand, deposits in banks, certificates of depos-
its, bankers' acceptances, debt and equity securities, and intangible as-
sets, with the exception of accounts receivable deriving from the sale
of goods and the provision of services. These are limited to a maxi-
mum amount, calculated on the basis of currency reserves, the cost of
imports, the scope of buy-backs in accordance with section 5.12, and
the amount of current interest payments;
136. The MEXICAN 1989-92 CREDIT AGREEMENT OF 1990, § 4.02; The MEXICAN ONLEND-
ING AND TRADE CREDIT AGREEMENT OF 1990, § 4.02.
137. MEXICAN COMBINED OLD NEW MONEY AGREEMENT OF 1990, at § 4.02; COMBINED
FACILITIES 2 AND 3 AGREEMENT OF 1990, § 4.02; MEXICAN COMBINED MULTI-YEAR
RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1990, § 4.02. In the last-named agreement, however, payments
prior to maturity to public creditors are excluded.
138. In the case of discount and par bonds, this prohibition only applies if Mexico is in
arrears with the payment of interest to the bond holders; see the MEXICAN DISCOUNT AND PAR
BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT OF 1990, Exhibit VII, § 16(a).
139. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., the MEXICAN 1989-1992 CREDIT AGREEMENT OF 1990, § 7.02(a).
141. The text of the newly introduced exceptions is reprinted in Appendix VII.
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(c) the use of the proceeds from new credits as security, provided
this occurs within three months after disbursement;
(d) liens on accounts receivable (insofar as they do not stem from
the sale of oil or gas) and other tangible assets apart from gold and the
assets already mentioned in (b);
(e) liens on the foreign currency indebtedness of Mexico and its
governmental agencies which are owed directly or indirectly to the
banks it controls (Mexican banks), their affiliates and branches, in as
far as they are established with the sole purpose of raising new funds
for these banks (special purpose affiliates), or which are owed to any
other governmental agencies;
(f) liens on the properties or revenues of the Mexican banks and
their special purpose affiliates to secure short-term indebtedness aris-
ing in connection with customary business or to secure new debts in-
cuffed in connection with the refinancing of existing debts to foreign
banks.
All in all, therefore, Mexico has been accorded substantial room to
maneuver in regard to the furnishing of securities. Future new indebt-
edness in connection with conversions designed to reduce debt can, in
accordance with (a), be secured to the same degree as discount and par
bonds. The other exceptions also apply to borrowing for the purpose
of covering future financial needs. For Mexico, as an oil-exporting
country, the fact that accounts receivable deriving from the sale of oil
and gas continue to be excluded from use as security, does, however,
represent a fundamental restriction.
IV. SUMMARY
As a result of the persistence of the debt crisis and, above all, the
launching of the Brady Initiative, the principle of equal treatment has
been modified by the introduction of various options into the terms of
the restructuring packages. This permits differences in the treatment
of the creditor banks, which can now behave in accordance with their
individual interests, without having to subject themselves to a joint
strategy. The restructuring process thus splits the former creditors
into two groups. On the one hand, there are the banks that wish to
maintain their presence in the debtor countries concerned and, conse-
quently, are willing to provide fresh money. On the other hand, there
are the banks that want to withdraw by opting for debt buy-backs or
some form of conversion, or which adopt a passive attitude. Further-
more, some Third World debtors are successfully finding their way
back to the international financial markets and covering a part of their
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capital requirements by issuing bonds at high rates of interest. 42
The move away from the principle of equal treatment will lead in
the future to competition among creditors over the distribution of for-
eign currency by the debtor countries. In view of their continuing
need for capital, the debtors will offer preferential treatment to those
banks that are willing to provide fresh money. Apart from the possi-
bility of providing security, the debtors will endeavor to service the
debts of these banks preferentially in order to create incentives for the
provision of new credits. At the same time, those banks that wish to
withdraw from the Third World countries by opting for buy-backs or
some form of conversion, or that choose to adopt a passive attitude,
will no longer profit from sharing obligations of the new money banks.
In view of the continuing lack of foreign currency of the debtors, they
will also be forced to accept greater reductions in their claims.
142. See Pemex kehrt an den Euromarket zurtick, HANDELSBLATr, March 30/31, 1990, at
35, col. 3; Public Eurobond Sale Successful, INT'L FIN. REV., March 24, 1990, at 33, col. 3.
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APPENDIX I
THE SHARING CLAUSE OF THE MEXICAN NEW
RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985
SECTION 5.03. Sharing of Payments; Etc. (a) Certain Terms De-
fined. As used in this Section, the "Applicable Rate" for converting any
amount denominated in one currency into another currency on any Cal-
culation Date shall be the average of the buy and sell spot rates of ex-
change in the latter currency for the former currency at the close of
business on the fifth Business Day next preceding such Calculation Date
as quoted, in the absence of manifest error, by the Financial Times of
London or, if such rates are not so quoted, by a comparable publication
or source to be selected by the Servicing Bank; "Bank Payment Date"
means the first Business Day falling at least five calendar days after the
Calculation Date; "Calculation Date" means, with respect to any Re-
porting Period, the first Business Day falling at least 20 days after the
end of such Reporting Period; "Sharing Request" means a notice to the
Servicing Bank by any Bank, which notice may not be given prior to the
first Interest Payment Date for a Credit of such Bank following the later
of the Interest Change Date and the Reconciliation Date for such Credit,
stating that such Bank has not received a payment of interest or princi-
pal or other amount due to such Bank under this Agreement, that such
Bank considers such unpaid amount to be significant and that such Bank
requests that the sharing provisions of this Section 5.03 be implemented;
"Reporting Bank" means, with respect to any Reporting Period, a Bank
that has delivered a report to the Servicing Bank pursuant to subsection
(d) of this Section; and "Reporting Periods" means successive periods
commencing on the date of a Declaration or the Servicing Bank's receipt
of a Sharing Request, the first of which shall be two calendar months
and the remainder of which shall be three calendar months.
(b) General Requirement of Sharing. Each Bank agrees that if it
shall at any time, through exercise of a right of banker's lien, setoff, liti-
gation or counterclaim or otherwise, obtain payment with respect to the
principal of or interest on the Credits owed to it that is proportionately
greater than the payment obtained by any other Bank with respect to the
principal of or interest on the Credits owed to such other Bank, the Bank
obtaining such proportionately, greater payment shall purchase from
each such other Bank, in the manner and on the terms set forth in this
Section, a participation in the principal of or interest on such other Cred-
its in such amount (and such other adjustments shall be made from time
to time) as shall be required to ensure that the Banks share such pay-
ments ratably as contemplated by this Section, provided the obligation to
share as required by this Section shall not exist until there has been a
Declaration or a Sharing Request, whereupon each Bank shall perform
its obligations under this Section strictly in accordance with its terms
and provided further that this Section shall not impair any right of any
Bank to apply amounts recovered by it to pay indebtedness other than
amounts due under this Agreement. Disproportionate payments of in-
terest shall be shared by the purchase of separate participations in un-
paid interest obligations and disproportionate payments of principal
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shall be shared by the purchase of separate participations in unpaid prin-
cipal obligations. In addition, the Banks agree to share disproportionate
payments of amounts other than interest on and principal of the Credits
due under this Agreement, any disproportionate payment of any such
other amount to be shared separately by participation and by type of
payment (expenses, etc.) due and obtained.
(c) Notifications. Each Bank shall immediately notify the Servicing
Bank of the amount and type of any payment obtained by such Bank
after the later of the Interest Change Date and the Reconciliation Date
of any Credit of such Bank with respect to such Credit, other than
through the Servicing Bank, of any amount due to such Bank under this
Agreement, and the Servicing Bank shall promptly notify the other
Banks thereof. The Servicing Bank shall immediately notify all Banks of
its receipt of a Sharing Request, which notice shall identify (i) the Bank
or Banks submitting a Sharing Request and (ii) the first Reporting
Period.
(d) Reports by Banks. Within five days after the end of each Report-
ing Period, each Bank shall deliver a report to the Servicing Bank stating
whether or not it obtained any payment during such Reporting Period
and, if so, the separate amounts of such payments received for principal,
interest of other amounts due under this Agreement (and, in the case of
the first such Reporting Period, the existence and amounts of any such
payments received by such Bank prior to such Reporting Period), pro-
vided that a Bank need not report any such payment received as a distri-
bution of funds by the Servicing Bank.
(e) Calculations. On each Calculation Date, the Servicing Bank
shall:
(i) determine the aggregate amount of all payments for principal,
interest and other amounts reported to the Servicing Bank pursuant to
subsection (d) of this Section within the time period therein specified
(excluding payments shared pursuant hereto as of any previous Calcu-
lation Date);
(ii) determine the portion of such aggregate amounts of principal,
interest and other amounts that would be allocated to each Reporting
Bank to ensure that the Reporting Banks share such aggregate
amounts ratably in proportion to the aggregate unpaid principal, in-
terest and other amounts owed to a Reporting Bank as of the end of
the immediately preceding Reporting Period;
(iii) give notice by telex or cable to each Reporting Bank that has
received payments in excess of its ratable share specifying (A) the
amounts of such excess in U.S. Dollars and the amounts of participa-
tions in the principal of or interest on the Credits and in the other
amounts owed to other Reporting Banks in each currency to be
purchased by such Bank with such excess to accomplish such ratable
sharing and (B) the Bank Payment Date on which sharing payments
shall be made; and
(iv) give notice by telex or cable to each Reporting Bank that has
received payments of less than its ratable share specifying the aggre-
gate amounts of participations in the principal of or interest on the
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Credits and in the other amounts owed to it to be purchased from it to
accomplish such ratable sharing.
For purposes of calculations under this Section the Servicing Bank shall
convert to U.S. Dollars all relevant amounts in other Credit Currencies
at the appropriate Applicable Rate for the relevant Calculation Date and
shall make distributions pursuant to subsection (f) of this Section on the
basis of the U.S. Dollar amounts so calculated.
(f) Payment for Participations. On each Bank Payment Date, each
Bank required to purchase participations shall pay the excess amounts
specified in such notice to the Servicing Bank in the currency in which
such excess amounts were due to such Bank hereunder. The Servicing
Bank shall convert all such payments received by it in currencies other
than U.S. Dollars into U.S. Dollars and for such purpose is authorized to
enter into currency exchange transactions on such dates and in such
amounts as it, in its sole discretion, shall determine. On the first Busi-
ness Day falling at least ten calendar days after the Calculation Date and
from time to time thereafter, at such intervals as the Servicing Bank in
its sole discretion shall determine, the Servicing Bank shall distribute to
the Banks from which participations are to be purchased their respective
proportionate shares of the U.S. Dollars theretofore received by the
Servicing Bank pursuant to this subsection (less any commissions or
other costs arising out of such currency exchange transactions). No ad-
justment shall be made in the amount of any participation because the
exchange value of any U.S. Dollars received by the seller of such partici-
pation is different on the date of receipt from the exchange value used to
determine the amount of such participation or because commissions and
other costs were deducted from amounts otherwise payable to such Bank
or because of any fluctuation of exchange rates.
(g) Accounting for Participations. The Servicing Bank shall keep
records (which shall be conclusive absent manifest error) of participa-
tions in principal, interest and other amounts purchased and sold pursu-
ant to this Section. Notwithstanding any provisions hereof to the
contrary, the Servicing Bank shall give effect to the purchases and sales
of participations reflected from time to time in such records for purposes
of (i) subsequent distributions to the Banks pursuant to this Article V
and (ii) subsequent calculations and distributions pursuant to this Sec-
tion. The rights of the owner of any such participation in a Credit
against the Bank to which such Credit is owed shall be limited to the
right to receive distributions with respect thereto from the Servicing
Bank as provided in this Section and to share in any other payments
received by such Bank as provided in this Section. It is understood that
each Bank shall retain all voting rights with respect to its Credits, irre-
spective of the sale of any participations in any such Credits pursuant to
this Section.
(h) Interest on Sharing Payments in Default. Any Bank which de-
faults in its obligation to make a sharing payment pursuant to subsection
(f) above shall pay interest to the Servicing Bank for the account of the
Banks entitled to participate in the sharing payment of such Bank, such
interest to accrue on the amount of the sharing payment in default from
the relevant Bank Payment Date, to be payable on demand and to be
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calculated at a rate per annum equal to the highest interest rate applica-
ble to the Credits of such defaulting Bank, or, if Credits of such default-
ing Bank are no longer outstanding, to the highest interest rate which
would be applicable to such Credits if they were outstanding.
(i) Rescission of Shared Payment. If any payment obtained by any
Bank from the Obligor, the Guarantor or Banco de Mexico is rescinded
or otherwise restored, and such payment has been shared by such Bank
pursuant to the provisions of this Section 5.03, then each Bank shall
promptly return to the Servicing Bank for the account of such Bank the
amount in U.S. Dollars calculated by the Servicing Bank to be attributa-
ble to the amount of the payment previously shared which is rescinded
or restored.
(j) Further Implementation. The Servicing Bank may (but shall not
be required to) suggest such additional procedures or adjustments under
this Section as it in its reasonable discretion may consider necessary or
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Section, but no such sug-
gestion by the Servicing Bank shall bind or charge the obligations of the
Banks or the Servicing Bank under this Section unless accepted in writ-
ing by all Banks.
(k) Obligor and Guarantor Acknowledgment. The Obligor and the
Guarantor each acknowledges and consents to the foregoing provisions
of this Section 5.03.
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APPENDIX II
THE MANDATORY PREPAYMENT CLAUSE OF THE
MEXICAN NEW RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT
OF 1985
SECTION 4.02. Mandatory Prepayments. (a) Upon More Favorable
Payments of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure. If after the date hereof
any Foreign Currency of the Obligor, the Guarantor, Banco de Mexico
or any other Mexican Public Sector Borrower shall be applied to repay,
in whole or in part, the principal amount of any 1984 Debt Subject to
Restructure, the Obligor shall on the next Interest Payment Date for
each Credit prepay such Credit by a principal amount which bears the
same relationship to the principal amount of such Credit then outstand-
ing (before giving effect to such repayment) as the principal amount of
the 1984 Debt Subject to Restructrue so repaid bears to the aggregate
principal amount of such 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure outstanding
on the date of such repayment (before giving effect to such repayment),
provided that this subsection shall not apply to any repayment of any
1984 Debt Subject to Restructure:
(i) in the case of a repayment of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure
of the Obligor, if both (x) the sum of such repayment and all other
repayments of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure of the Obligor made
in the calendar year in which such repayment is made does not exceed
the amount specified in item 19 of Schedule I to this Agreement (or its
equivalent in other currencies) and (y) the sum of such repayment and
all other repayments of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure of all Mexi-
can Public Sector Borrowers (including the Obligor) made in the cal-
endar year in which such repayment is made does not exceed
U.S.$50,000,000 (or its equivalent in other currencies), provided that
any portion of either such permitted amount not utilized in any calen-
dar year may be utilized in the following calendar year as more fully
described below; or
(ii) in the case of a repayment of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure
of a Mexican Public Sector Borrower other than the Obligor if both
(x) such repayment does not require mandatory repayment under the
New Restructure Agreement, if any, of such Mexican Public Sector
Borrower and (y) the sum of such repayment and all other repayments
of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure of all Mexican Public Sector Bor-
rowers (including the Obligor) made in the calendar year in which
such repayment is made does not exceed U.S. $50,000,000 (or its
equivalent in other currencies), provided that any portion of such per-
mitted amount not utilized in any calendar year may be utilized in the
following calendar year as more fully described below; or
(iii) if such repayment is (x) an involuntary prepayment made pur-
suant to illegality provisions of existing contracts applicable to such
1984 Debt Subject to Restructure or (y) a prepayment permitted by
substitute LIBO provisions of another New Restructure Agreement
whose substitute LIBO provisions are comparable to the substitute
LIBO provisions of this Agreement; or
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(iv) if such repayment is a prepayment made pursuant to the
mandatory prepayment provisions of another New Restructure Agree-
ment whose mandatory prepayment provisions are comparable to the
mandatory prepayment provisions of this Agreement; or
(v) if such repayment is made from assets or revenues subject to a
Lien existing on August 23, 1982 and created to secure or provide for
the payment of such 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure or from the
proceeds of such assets or revenues; or
(vi) if such repayment is made pursuant to a repayment schedule
for 1984 Specified Debt consistent with the Financing Principles.
For purposes of determining that portion, if any, of the permitted
amounts referred to in clauses (x) and (y) of subsection (i) and clause (y)
of subsection (ii) above which is available to be carried forward to a
succeeding year, repayments of 1984 Debt Subject to Restructure made
in any calendar year shall be applied, first, against that part, if any, of
such permitted amount which was not utilized in, and was carried over
from, the preceding calendar year, and, second, against that part of such
amount which first became available for the calendar year of such repay-
ment. Each partial prepayment with respect to a Credit pursuant to this
Section shall reduce the principal installments applicable to such Credit
in the inverse order of their maturities. The Obligor shall give the Serv-
icing Bank irrevocable notice of any prepayment pursuant to this Section
at least five Business Days prior thereto, specifying the principal amount
of Credits to be prepaid and the date of such prepayment, whereupon the
principal amounts so specified, together with interest accrued thereon,
shall become due and payable on the date so specified.
(b) Upon Repayments of Other Debt. In the event the Obligor, the
Guarantor, Banco de Mexico or any other Governmental Agency shall
voluntarily repay Other Debt (as defined below) earlier than as required
by the payment schedule therefor as in effect on the date hereof (each
such repayment being a "Prepayment of Other Debt"), then the Obligor
shall prepay each Credit by a principal amount which bears the same
relationship to the principal amount of such Credit then outstanding
(before giving effect to such repayment) as the principal amount of the
Other Debt so repaid bears to the principal amount of such Other Debt
outstanding on the date of such repayment (before giving effect to such
repayment), provided that this subsection shall not apply to any repay-
ment of any Other Debt:
(i) if such repayment is (x) an involuntary prepayment made pur-
suant to illegality provisions of contracts applicable to such Other
Debt, (y) a prepayment permitted by increased cost or substitute
LIBO provisions of contracts applicable to such Other Debt, or (z) a
prepayment made pursuant to any other similar contractual provision
specifically designed to enable the obligor to avoid economically bur-
densome results; or
(ii) to the extent a credit facility relating to such Other Debt is
utilized again by the obligor within thirty days of such repayment.
Prepayments of each Credit shall be made in the Credit Currency of
such Credit and shall be made on the first Interest Payment Date for
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each Credit falling after the prepayment obligation arises, and on each
Interest Payment Date thereafter in the event of additional Prepayments
of Other Debt. As used herein, "Other Debt" means all External Indebt-
edness outstanding on August 23, 1982 which does not constitute either
Specified Debt, 1984 Specified Debt or obligations under leases. The pre-
payment obligation under this subsection (b) shall arise in each calendar
year when the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as computed in accordance with
Section 13.16) of the Prepayments of Other Debt made in such year
equals the sum of (i) U.S. $50,000,000 plus (ii) any additional amount
available for use in such year pursuant to the next sentence. Any portion
of such U.S. $50,000,000 minimum permitted Prepayments of Other
Debt which is not utilized in any calendar year may be utilized in subse-
quent calendar years. Within 30 days after the end of each calendar
quarter, the Guarantor will report to the Servicing Bank all Prepayments
of Other Debt, if any, during the preceding calendar quarter, and the
Servicing Bank shall give prompt notice thereof to the Banks. Any pre-
payment of the Credits pursuant hereto shall be applied to the principal
installments of each Credit in the inverse order of maturity.
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APPENDIX III
CATALOGUE OF EXCEPTIONS TO THE NEGATIVE PLEDGE
CLAUSE OF THE MEXICAN NEW
RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT OF 1985
(i) Liens upon any property acquired or held by any Governmental
Agency incurred to secure the purchase price of such property or to se-
cure External Indebtedness incurred for the purpose of financing the ac-
quisition of such property and any renewal or extension of any such Lien
which is limited to the original property covered thereby and which
secures any renewal or extension of the original secured financing; or
(ii) Liens existing on such property at the time of its acquisition and any
renewal or extension of any such Lien which is limited to the original
property covered thereby and which secures any renewal or extension of
the original secured financing, provided that the aggregate principal
amount of the External Indebtedness secured by the Liens referred to in
clause (i) above and this clause (ii) above does not exceed 120% of the
purchase price of such property at any time outstanding; or
(iii) Liens in favor of the Bank for International Settlements or other
multilateral monetary authorities or central banks or treasuries of sover-
eign states other than the United Mexican States securing extensions of
credit the duration of which does not exceed one year; or
(iv) Liens arising in the course of ordinary commercial banking transac-
tions (and expiring within one year thereafter) to finance the importation
or exportation of goods or services into or from the United Mexican
States; or
(v) Liens on property acquired (or deemed to be acquired) by the Guar-
antor or any Governmental Agency under a financial lease, or claims
arising from the use or loss of or damage to such property, provided that
(A) any such Lien secures only rentals and other amounts payable under
such lease and (B) either (x) such property was not owned by the Guar-
antor or any Governmental Agency at any time prior to becoming sub-
ject to such lease unless at the time of the acquisition of such property
contractual arrangements contemplated that such lease would be exe-
cuted or (y) such property was acquired from an entity other than the
Guarantor or a Governmental Agency within one year prior to the exe-
cution of such lease; or
(vi) Liens which arise pursuant to any order of attachment, distraint or
similar legal process arising in connection with court proceedings and
Liens which secure the reimbursement obligation for any bond obtained
in connection with the release of property from Liens arising pursuant to
such legal process, so long as the execution or other enforcement of such
Liens arising pursuant to such legal process is effectively stayed and the
claims secured thereby are being contested in good faith by appropriate
proceedings, provided that any such Lien is released or discharged in any
case within one year of its imposition; or
(vii) Liens arising by operation of law (and not pursuant to any agree-
ment) which have not been foreclosed or otherwise enforced against the
properties to which they apply; or
(viii) Liens securing or providing for the payment of External Indebted-
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ness incurred in connection with any Project Financing, provided that
the properties to which any such Lien applies are (A) properties which
are the subject of such Project Financing or (B) revenues or claims
which arise from the operation, failure to meet specifications, failure to
complete, exploitation, sale or loss of, or damage to, such properties; or
(ix) Liens in existence on the date hereof, provided that such Liens re-
main confined to the properties presently affected thereby and properties
which become affected by such Liens under contracts in effect on the
date of this Agreement and provided further that such Liens secure or
provide for the payment of only those obligations so secured or provided
for on the date hereof or any refinancing of such obligations; or
(x) Liens arising in connection with contracts entered into substantially
simultaneously for sales and purchases at market prices of precious met-
als; or
(xi) any Lien on Exportable Assets securing External Indebtedness in-
curred to finance the business of producing and/or exporting such Ex-
portable Assets, provided that (A) such Lien applies only to goods which
are expected to be sold or documents evidencing title thereto and the
proceeds of any insurance thereon, and the proceeds of sale of which are
expected to be received within 12 months after such goods or proceeds
become subject to such Lien and (B) such External Indebtedness (i) is
incurred in the normal course of business, (ii) is to be repaid primarily
out of proceeds of sale of the Exportable Assets, subject to such Lien and
(iii) does not arise out of financing provided by the lender with a view to
obtaining repayment of other External Indebtedness or on condition that
other External Indebtedness be repaid and (C) such Lien is not on oil or
gas or the right to receive payment for oil or gas.
As used in this subsection, "Exportable Assets" means goods which are sold
or intended to be sold for a consideration consisting of or denominated in
Foreign Currency and any right to receive Foreign Currency in connection
with the sale thereof; and "Project Financing" means any financing (but not
a refinancing) of the acquisition, construction or development of any
properties in connection with a project if the Person or Persons providing
such financing expressly agree to look to the properties financed and the
revenues to be generated by the operation of, or loss of or damage to, such
properties as the principal source of repayment for the moneys advanced
and have been provided with a feasibility study prepared by competent in-
dependent experts on the basis of which it was reasonable to concluded
that such project would generate sufficient foreign currency income to re-
pay substantially all of the principal of and interest on all External Indebt-




SECTION 5.11 OF THE MEXICAN AGREEMENTS IN THE
RESTRUCTURING ROUND OF 1987
SECTION 5.11. Exchange of Advances. (a) General; Definitions.
This Section 5.11. sets forth procedures for the exchange of Advances for
Qualified Capital Stock, Qualified Debt or a Qualified Investment. For
purposes of this Section 5.11, the following terms shall have the follow-
ing meanings:
"Mexican Person" means any Person who, in the case of an individ-
ual, is a national of the United Mexican States or, in the case of an en-
tity, has its principal place of business in the United Mexican States.
"Qualified Capital Stock" means capital stock (including equivalent
interests) of any Mexican public sector entity or Mexican private sector
company (including a partnership or trust) (i) which is issued in regis-
tered, certificated form in the name of such Bank or a Person designated
by such Bank which is not a Mexican Person, (ii) which is not transfera-
ble on the registration books of such public sector entity or private sector
company before January 1, 1998 to any Mexican Person and the certifi-
cate of which bears a legend with such restriction, (iii) which is not by its
terms subject to redemption earlier than the amortization of the Ad-
vance or Advances exchanged for such capital stock, (iv) which is not
entitled to guarantied dividends payable irrespective of earnings and
profits, except as expressly contemplated by Article 123 of the Ley Gen-
eral de Sociedades Mercantiles, and (v) which is not convertible into any
instrument or security other than Qualified Capital Stock.
"Qualified Debt" means indebtedness of any Mexican public or pri-
vate sector entity that (a) has a Weighted Average Life to Maturity not
less than the Weighted Average Life to Maturity of the Advance of Ad-
vances exchanged for such indebtedness at the time of such exchange or
(b) is offered in exchange for all Advances (or a portion thereof) under
any Facility to all Banks pro rata in accordance with the principal
amount of their Advances under such Facility on the same terms; where
"Weighted Average Life to Maturity" means, with respect to any in-
debtedness at the time of determination, the number of years obtained by
dividing the then Remaining Dollar-Years of such indebtedness by the
then outstanding principal amount of such indebtedness, and
"Remaining Dollar-Years" means, with respect to any indebtedness
at the time of determination, the amount obtained by (a) multiplying the
amount of each then remaining required repayment, including each final
maturity, sinking fund payment, installment maturity, serial maturity or
other required payment or redemption, by the number of years (calcu-
lated to the nearest one-quarter) which will elapse between the time of
determination and the date of the making of that repayment or redemp-
tion and (b) totalling all of the products obtained in (a).
"Qualified Investment" means the payment by a Mexican Person of
indebtedness denominated in Mexican pesos owed to a Mexican bank or
trust (including FICORCA), the purchase by a Mexican Person of capi-
tal assets located in Mexico (including capital stock of a Mexican con-
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pany) and capital expenditures and other categories of approved
expenditures by a Mexican Person, to the extent such payments,
purchases and expenditures are specifically authorized by all appropriate
Mexican governmental authorities.
"Section 5.11 Notice" means a notice substantially in the form of Ex-
hibit 22 delivered to the Agent pursuant to this Section 5.11 upon the
exchange of an Advance for Qualified Capital Stock, Qualified Debt or a
Qualified Investment.
"Section 5.11 Notice Acknowledgment" means for each exchange of
Advances described in a Section 5.11 Notice, a notice substantially in the
form of Exhibit 23 delivered by the Agent to the Bank and the Borrower
pursuant to this Section 5.11 acknowledging the particulars of such
exchange.
(b) Exchange of Advances for Qualified Capital Stock. Subject to
written agreement between the Borrower and any Bank and subject to all
required Mexican governmental authorizations, including authorization
by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the National Commission
on Foreign Investment and the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the
United Mexican States, all or a portion of the Advances held by such
Bank may be exchanged for Qualified Capital Stock. The Borrower and
such Bank will promptly notify the Agent in writing of any such agree-
ment that has been so authorized, which notice shall specify each Ad-
vance (or portion thereof) to be exchanged for such Qualified Capital
Stock. Upon delivery of such Qualified Capital Stock by or on behalf of
the Borrower to such Bank or its designee, (i) each Advance (or portion
thereof) in respect of which such Qualified Capital Stock is delivered
shall cease to be an "Advance" and "External Indebtedness" for all pur-
poses of this Agreement and the Borrower shall have no further obliga-
tions hereunder in respect of any such Advance (or portion thereof) and
(ii) the Borrower and such Bank shall deliver to the Agent a Section 5.11
Notice reducing the principal amount of each such Advance by the prin-
cipal amount exchanged for such Qualified Capital Stock.
(c) Exchange of Advances for Qualified Debt. Subject to written
agreement between the Borrower and any Bank and subject to all re-
quired Mexican governmental authorizations, including authorization by
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, all or a portion of the Ad-
vances held by such Bank may be exchanged for Qualified Debt. The
Borrower and such Bank will promptly notify the Agent in writing of
any such agreement that has been so authorized, which notice shall spec-
ify each Advance (or portion thereof) to be exchanged for such Qualified
Debt. Upon delivery of such Qualified Debt by or on behalf of the Bor-
rower to such Bank or its designee, (i) each Advance (or portion thereof)
in respect of which such Qualified Debt is delivered shall cease to be an
"Advance" and "External Indebtedness" for all purposes of this Agree-
ment and the Borrower shall have no further obligations hereunder in
respect of any such Advance (or portion thereof) and (ii) the Borrower
and such Bank shall deliver to the Agent a Section 5.11 Notice reducing
the principal amount of each such Advance by the principal amount ex-
changed for such Qualified Debt.
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(d) Exchange of Advances for Qualified Investments. In the event
that the appropriate Mexican governmental authorities shall at any time
so authorize, subject to written agreement between the Borrower, a Mex-
ican Person and any Bank, all or a portion of the Advances held by such
Bank may be acquired by a Mexican Person and used to make one or
more Qualified Investments in accordance with applicable Mexican gov-
ernmental rules and regulations. The Borrower and such Bank will
promptly notify the Agent in writing of any such agreement that has
been so authorized, which notice shall specify each Advance (or portion
thereof) to be acquired by such Mexican Person and used for such Qual-
ified Investment. Upon such Bank's notification to the Agent of its
transfer of each such Advance (or portion thereof) to such Mexican Per-
son in contemplation of a Qualified Investment approved by all appropri-
ate Mexican governmental authorities, (i) each Advance (or portion
thereof) to be used for such Qualified Investment shall cease to be an
"Advance" and "External Indebtedness" for all purposes of this Agree-
ment and the Borrower shall have no further obligations hereunder in
respect of any such Advance (or portion thereof) and (ii) the Borrower
and such Bank shall deliver to the Agent a Section 5.11 Notice reducing
the principal amount of each such Advance by the principal amount
thereof acquired by such Mexican Person.
(e) Limited Responsibility of the Agent. The Agent shall have no re-
sponsibility to review or verify (i) the accuracy of the statements of the
Bank and Borrower contained in any notice or Section 5.11 Notice re-
ceived by it under this Section 5.11, (ii) that any exchange under this
Section 5.11 satisfies the definition of Qualified Capital Stock, Qualifed
Debt or Qualified Investment or (iii) that any required authorization for
any exchange under this Section 5.11 has been obtained. The Agent
shall be entitled to rely on the information contained in each Section
5.11 Notice as to whether the requirements of this Section 5.11 have
been satisfied.
(f) Effect of a Section 5.11 Transaction. It is understood and the
parties concur that any exchange or cancellation of an Advance (or por-
tion thereof) hereunder pursuant to this Section 5.11 or any exchange or
cancellation of any credit or advance or other payment obligation (or
portion thereof) pursuant to Section 5.11 of the 1983 New Money
Agreement, the 1984 New Money Agreement, any Restructure Agree-
ment or any New Restructure Agreement or pursuant to any compara-
ble provision of the FICORCA Facility Agreement shall not constitute
for purposes of this Agreement receipt of a payment in respect of any
Advance hereunder or of any other credit or advance or other obligation
so exchanged or cancelled and shall not (i) give rise to a prepayment
obligation under Section 4.02 of this Agreement or (ii) be subject to the
sharing requirements of Section 5.03 of this Agreement.
(g) Closing Date for a Section 5.11 Exchange. The Borrower and the
Bank shall give the Agent not less than ten calendar days' notice of any
proposed exchange under this Section 5.11, and the closing date for any
such exchange shall be subject to mutual agreement between the Bor-
rower and the Agent in order to facilitate the efficient administration of
this Agreement. Each Section 5.11 Notice shall be effective upon ac-
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knowledgment (including telex acknowledgment) by the Agent pursuant
to a Section 5.11 Notice Acknowledgment.
(h) Special Provision for Notices to the Agent. Each Section 5.11 No-
tice is a communication to the Agent from both the Borrower and a
Bank. Each such Notice specifies the amount of the reduction in the
principal amount of one or more Advances. The form of each such Sec-
tion 5.11 Notice requires that both the Borrower and such Bank send
each such Notice to the Agent. The requirement of joint notice by the
Borrower and the Bank may be satisfied in any one of three ways:
(i) By joint signature and delivery to the Agent by the Borrower
and a Bank of any such Notice;
(ii) By separate transmittal to the Agent (including telex or fac-
simile transmittal acceptable to the Agent) by each of the Borrower
and a Bank of a substantially identical Notice; or
(iii) By transmittal to the Agent (including telex or such facsimile)
by either the Borrower or a Bank of any such Notice, followed by the
Agent's receipt of written confirmation (including telex or such fac-
simile) by the other party to such Notice of the information set forth
in such Notice, which confirmation shall be in form and substance
satisfactory to the Agent.
(i) Notice to IBRD. A copy of each Section 5.11 Notice and each
Section 5.11 Notice Acknowledgment describing any exchange pursuant
to this Section 5.11 for a Facility 2 Advance or a Facility 3 Advance
shall be sent to IBRD.
(0) Reduction of IBRD Guaranty Amounts. From the closing date of
the reduction in the principal amount of any Facility 2 Advance ocur-
ring pursuant to an exchange under this Section 5.11, the IBRD Facility
2 Guaranty Amount shall be reduced by an amount equal to 50% of the
U.S. Dollar equivalent of the amount of such reduction as provided in
the definition of IBRD Facility 2 Guaranty Amount. From the closing
date of the reduction in the principal amount of any Facility 3 Advance
ocurring pursuant to an exchange under this Section 5.11, the IBRD
Facility 3 Guaranty Amount shall be reduced by an amount equal to
50% of the U.S. Dollar equivalent of the amount of such reduction as




SECTION 5.12 OF THE MEXICAN COMBINED OLD NEW
MONEY AGREEMENT OF 1990
SECTION 5.12. Purchase of Advances. (a) General; Definitions. This
Section sets forth procedures for certain purchases of Advances. For
purposes of this Section, the following terms have the following
meanings:
"Section 5.12 Notice" means a notice substantially in the form of
Schedule F delivered to the Agent under this Section upon the purchase
of an Advance (or portion thereof) by the Borrower under this Section.
"Section 5.12. Notice Acknowledgment" means, for each purchase of
an Advance (or portion thereof) by the Borrower described in a Section
5.12 Notice, a notice substantially in the form of Schedule G delivered
by the Agent to the Bank and the Borrower pursuant to this Section 5.12
acknowledging the details of such purchase.
(b) Purchase of Advances. Subject to agreement between the pur-
chaser and any Bank, the Borrower or (subject to Section 12.10 (b)) any
Governmental Agency may purchase all or a portion of the Advances
held by such Bank; provided that
(i) such purchase is made pursuant to an offer made to all Banks
pro rata in accordance with the principal amount of their Advances on
the same terms, and
(ii) immediately after and giving effect to such purchase, the sum
of (x) the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as determined in accordance with
Section 12.16 (a)) of the aggregate amount of cash used during the
calendar year in which such purchase is made for all purchases of
indebtedness (other than purchases of New Money Bonds) subject to
the requirements of Section 5.12 (b) (ii) of any Mexican Debt Agree-
ment (including this Agreement) and (y) the amount of Available As-
sets pledged during such calendar year in accordance with Section
8.02 (a) (xiii) and (xiv) does not exceed the sum of (1) the aggregate of
the amounts specified in clauses (A) and (B) of Section 8.02 (a) (xiii)
and (2) the amount permitted under Section 8.02 (a) (xiv).
Upon the purchase of all or a portion of an Advance by the Borrower,
such Advance (or portion thereof) shall be deemed cancelled and shall
cease to be an "Advance" and "External Indebtedness" for all purposes
of this Agreement and the Borrower shall have no further obligations
hereunder in respect of any such Advance (or portion thereof), and the
Borrower and such Bank shall deliver to the Agent a Section 5.12 Notice
reducing the principal amount of each such Advance by the principal
amount of such Advance (or portion thereof) purchased by the
Borrower.
(c) Exceptions for Certain Purchases of Advances by Mexican Banks.
(i) The requirements of Section 5.12 (b) (i) and (ii) shall not apply
to the purchase of any Advance (or portion thereof) by any Mexican
Bank (A) for its trading account in the ordinary course of business,
(B) for its own account or for the account of another Governmental
Agency (including the Borrower), in each case to the extent that such
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Advance (or portion thereof) so purchased is used to make a Section
5.11 Qualified Investment or (C) for the account of any customer that
is not a Governmental Agency.
(ii) The requirements of Section 5.12 (b) (i) shall not apply to the
purchase of any Adance (or portion thereof) by a Mexican Bank (or
any Special Purpose Affiliate) for its own account or for the account of
another Governmental Agency (including the Borrower), in each case
to the extent that the Advance (or portion thereof) so purchased is
pledged to secure External Indebtedness of such Mexican Bank (or
any Special Purpose Affiliate) or Governmental Agency.
(d) Limited Responsibility of Agent. The Agent shall have no re-
sponsibility to review or verify (i) the accuracy of the statements of the
Bank and the Borrower contained in any Section 5.12 Notice or other
notice received by it under this Section 5.12, (ii) that any purchase under
this Section 5.12. satisfies the requirements of subsection (b) or (c) above,
or (iii) that any required authorization for any purchase of Advances
under this Section 5.12 has been obtained. The Agent shall be entitled to
rely upon the information contained in each Section 5.12 Notice as to
whether the requirements of this Section 5.12 have been satisfied.
Promptly after its receipt of a Section 5.12 Notice, the Agent shall con-
firm that the information set forth therein is consistent with its records
and, upon such confirmation, promptly acknowledge such Notice. Each
Section 5.12 Notice shall be effective upon acknowledgment (including
acknowledgment by telex or facsimile transmission) by the Agent pursu-
ant to a Section 5.12 Notice Acknowledgment.
(e) Effect of a Section 5.12 Transaction. It is understood and the
parties concur that any purchase or cancellation of an Advance (or por-
tion thereof) hereunder pursuant to this Section 5.12, or any purchase or
cancellation of any Other Indebtedness pursuant to Section 5.12 of any
other Mexican Debt Agreement, shall not constitute for the purposes of
this Agreement receipt of a payment in respect of any Advance hereun-
der or of any Other Indebtedness so purchased or cancelled and shall not
(i) give rise to a prepayment obligation under Section 4.02 or (ii) be sub-
ject to the sharing requirements of Section 5.03. Any purchase of a por-
tion of an Advance pursuant to this Section 5.12 shall be applied ratably
to the principal installments of such Advance.
(f) Closing Date for a Section 5.12 Purchase. The Borrower and the
Bank shall give the Agent not less than ten calendar days' notice of any
proposed purchase by the Borrower under this Section, and the closing
date for any such purchase shall be subject to mutual agreement between
the Borrower and the Agent in order to facilitate the efficient administra-
tion of this Agreement.
(g) Special Provision for Notices to the Agent. Each Section 5.12 No-
tice is a communication to the Agent from both the Borrower and a
Bank. Each such Notice specifies the amount of the reduction in the
principal amount of one or more Advances. The form of each such Sec-
tion 5.12 Notice requires that both the Borrower and such Bank send
each such Notice to the Agent. The requirement of joint notice by the
Borrower and the Bank may be satisfied in any one of three ways:
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(i) by joint signature and delivery (including delivery by facsimile
transmission) to the Agent by the Borrower and a Bank of any such
Notice;
(ii) by separate transmittal to the Agent (including telex or facsim-
ile transmission) by each of the Borrower and a Bank of a substan-
tially identical Notice; or
(iii) by transmittal to the Agent (including telex or facsimile trans-
mission) by either the Borrower or a Bank of any such Notice, fol-
lowed by the Agent's receipt of written confirmation (including telex
or facsimile transmission) by the other party to such Notice of the
informtion set forth in such Notice, which confirmation shall be in
form and substance satisfactory to the Agent.
(h) Expenses to the Agent. The Bank or Banks party to each
purchase of Advances by the Borrower under this Section shall pay the
reasonable expenses of the Agent to administer and record such
purchase, unless the Borrower shall otherwise agree to pay such
expenses.
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APPENDIX VI
THE NEW DEFINITION OF QUALIFIED DEBT IN THE
NEW MEXICAN AGREEMENTS
"Qualified Debt" means indebtedness of any Mexican public or pri-
vate sector entity (or of any non-Mexican entity that is owned or con-
trolled by a Mexican Person or a Mexican public or private sector entity)
that
(a) is offered in exchange for all Advances (or portion thereof) to all
Banks pro rata in accordance with the principal amount of their Ad-
vances (or such portion thereof) on the same terms, or
(b) has a Duration at least equal to the Specified Duration, or
(c) has a Duration that is not less than the Specified Duration minus
1.5 years; provided that indebtedness exchanged for Advances in any sin-
gle transaction shall not constitute "Qualified Debt" under this clause (c)
unless the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as determined in accordance with Sec-
tion 12.16 (a)) of the aggregate principal amount of such indebtedness:
(i) does not exceed U.S. $500 million; and
(ii) when added to the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as so determined) of
the aggregate principal amount of all other indebtedness constituting
Qualified Debt pursuant to this clause (c) (but not pursuant to clause
(a) or (b) above) and all Other Qualified Debt exchanged, in each case,
for Advances or Other Indebtedness during the same calendar year,
does not exceed the sum of (x) U.S. $2.5 billion plus (y) the excess (if
any) of U.S. $2.5 billion over the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as so deter-
mined) of the aggregate principal amount of such Qualified Debt and
Other Qualified Debt exchanged for Advances and Other Indebted-
ness during the immediately preceding calendar year.
For purposes of this definition of "Qualified Debt":
(i) "Specified Duration" means, with respect to any new debt to be





Da = the Duration of such Advances or Other Indebtedness;
PVn = the Present Value of such new debt; and
PV. = the Present Value of such Advances or Other
Indebtedness;
provided that, if any new debt to be exchanged for Advances or Other Indebt-
edness is not denominated in the currency of such Advances or Other Indebt-
edness, the calculations of Specified Duration and Duration shall be made
using the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as determined in accordance with Section
12.16 (a)) of the Present Value of such new debt and of such Advances or
Other Indebtedness;
(ii) "Duration" means, with respect to any indebtedness, the number of
years obtained by dividing (x) the Present Value Remaining Payment-Years
of such indebtedness by (y) the Present Value of such indebtedness;
(iii) "Present Value Remaining Payment-Years" means, with respect to
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any indebtedness, the sum of each of the products obtained by multiplying (x)
the Present Value of each then remaining required repayment or payment
(including each final maturity, sinking fund payment, interest payment (as-
suming, where the amount of such interest payment is based upon a variable
or floating reference rate of interest, that such rate of interest is fixed at the
rate in effect on the date of determination), installment maturity, serial ma-
turity or other required payment) or redemption with respect to such indebt-
edness by (y) the number of years (calculated to the nearest one-quarter of a
year) which will elapse between the time of determination and the date of the
making of such repayment, payment or redemption;
(iv) "Loan Currency Discount Rate" means, (A) with respect to any in-
debtedness denominated in any Loan Currency (other than Italian Lire), the
LIBO Rate for LIBO Rate Advances denominated in such Loan Currency
(assuming an Interest Period of three months beginning on the date of deter-
mination) plus 13/16% per annum, (B) with respect to any indebtedness de-
nominated in Italian Lire, the Italian Lira Domestic Rate (assuming an
Interest Period of three months beginning on the date of determination) plus
13/16% per annum, and (C) with respect to any indebtedness denominated
in a currency that is not a Loan Currency hereunder, the rate per annum
determined by the Borrower to be the comparable yield in such currency;
(v) "Other Qualified Debt" means indebtedness that constitutes "Quali-
fied Debt" pursuant to clause (c) of the definition of that term contained in
Section 5.11 of the Mexican Debt Agreements other than this Agreement (but
that would not constitute "Qualified Debt" pursuant to clause (a) or (b) of
that definition); and
(vi) "Present Value" means, with respect to any indebtedness, the present
value (calculated using the Loan Currency Discount Rate) of the aggregate
amount of principal and interest to be payable in respect of such
indebtedness.
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APPENDIX VII
ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE NEGATIVE PLEDGE
CLAUSE IN THE NEW MEXICAN AGREEMENTS
(xii) (A) Liens in favor of the collateral agent for the Discount and
Par Bonds securing the repayment of principal at maturity of the Dis-
count and Par Bonds and the payment of interest on such Bonds in an
amount not exceeding, for each Series of Bonds, the Original Level (as
defined in the Discount and Par Bonds) (less any amounts released from
such Lien after the Exchange Date under (and as defined in) the Dis-
count and Par Bond Exchange Agreement as a result of any redemption,
or purchase and cancellation, of all or part of the Discount and Par
Bonds),
(B) any Liens securing the repayment of principal of, or the payment
of interest on, other public issues of bonds of Mexico outstanding on the
date hereof to the extent created to secure such bonds equally and rata-
bly with the Discount and Par Bonds,
(C) any Liens securing the repayment of principal at maturity of,
and the payment of a portion of the interest on, up to U.S. $3.5 billion
(or equivalent) principal amount of loans, bonds or other debt instru-
ments ("Exchanged Debt") issued by Mexico upon surrender of instru-
ments issued in connection with Mexico's debt conversion program in
exchange for any Discount or Par Bond or indebtedness under any Mex-
ican Debt Agreement, to the extent that such Liens are created to secure
such Exchanged Debt on a basis comparable to the Discount and Par
Bonds and
(D) any Liens securing the repayment of principal at maturity of,
and the payment of a portion of the interest on, loans, bonds or other
debt instruments ("Substituted Debt") issued upon surrender of Dis-
count or Par Bonds, to the extent such Liens are created to secure such
Substituted Debt on a basis comparable to the Discount and Par Bonds;
provided that the terms of such Substituted Debt (including, but not lim-
ited to, interest rate and amortization) are no more favorable to the hold-
ers thereof than those of the Discount or Par Bonds, as the case may be,
surrendered in exchange therefor; or
(xiii) Liens on Available Assets (as defined below) not permitted by
any other clause of this subsection; provided that, after giving effect to
any such Lien, the sum of (x) the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as determined
in accordance with Section 12.16 (a)) of the aggregate Available Assets
that become subject to such Liens (valuing each such Available Asset at
its market value at the time the Lien on such Available Asset arises) in
the calendar year in which such Lien is created (and excluding from
such aggregate Available Assets any Available Assets previously subject
to a Lien to secure External Indebtedness of the Borrower or any Gov-
ernmental Agency and later released from such Lien) plus (y) the U.S.
Dollar equivalent (as so determined) of the cash used during such calen-
dar year to purchase indebtedness (other than purchases of New Money
Bonds) subject to the requirements of Section 5.12 (b) (ii) of the Mexican
Debt Agreements (including this Agreement) does not exceed the sum of
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(A) U.S. $500,000,000 plus
(B) 50% of the amount, if any, by which the aggregate amount of
International Monetary Assets (adjusted as provided in clause (xiv)
below) at the last day of the most recently ended February, May, Au-
gust or November
exceeds the sum of
(1) U.S. $500,000,000 plus
(2) 50% of the sum of (x) the U.S. Dollar equivalent (as determined
in accordance with Section 12.16 (a)) of the aggregate cost of imports
into the United Mexican States for the six-month period ending most
recently before the date of determination, plus (y) the U.S. Dollar
equivalent (as so determined) of the aggregate amount of interest pay-
ments required to be made during such six-month period by the Bor-
rower and Governmental Agencies on External Indebtedness; or
(xiv) Liens on the proceeds of any loans or advances made to the
Borrower of any Governmental Agency (other than Excluded Proceeds
(as defined below)) that arise within three months after the date of dis-
bursement of such loans or advances, it being understood that any por-
tion of such proceeds not so pledged or used for the purchase of
indebtedness under Section 5.12 of any Mexican Debt Agreement (in-
cluding this Agreement) shall not be considered a part of International
Monetary Assets for purposes of clause (xiii) above until three months
after the date of its disbursement; or
(xv) Liens on Accounts Receivable (as defined below) and Tangible
Assets (as defined below); or
(xvi) Liens on External Indebtedness of the Borrower or of any other
Governmental Agency owed to any Mexican Bank, any Special Purpose
Affiliate or any other Governmental Agency; or
(xvii) Liens on the properties or revenues of any Mexican Bank or
any Special Purpose Affiliate:
(A) to secure the repayment of any liability that by its terms matures
more than one year after the date of its incurrence and that is incurred
by such Mexican Bank or any Special Purpose Affiliate in connection
with the refinancing of
(1) any liabilities of the foreign agencies and branches of such Mex-
ican Bank to one or more non-Mexican commercial banks, or
(2) in the case of any Mexican Bank that does not have a foreign
agency or branch, existing money market lines of credit (including
replacements thereof) payable in a Foreign Currency by such Mexi-
can Bank to one or more non-Mexican commercial banks, includ-
ing, in each case, a refinancing by means of the purchase of existing
liabilities or money market lines and the pledge thereof in connec-
tion with such refinancing or,
(B) to secure any liability that by its terms is payable on demand or
matures within one year after the date of its incurrence and that arises
in the ordinary conduct of the commercial banking business of such
Mexican Bank.
As used in this subsection (a),
"Accounts Receivable" means amounts payable on the Borrower or
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any Governmental Agency in respect of the sale, lease or other provision
of goods, energy, services or the like (other than oil or gas), whether or
not yet earned by performance.
"Available Assets" means cash on hand or on deposit in banks, certifi-
cates of deposit and bankers acceptances, debt and equity securities and
intangible assets (other than Accounts Receivable and accounts receiva-
ble deriving from the sale of oil and gas).
"Exluded Proceeds" means the proceeds of
(A) loans or advances made or bonds issued under the 1989 New
Money Agreements,
(B) purchases under the 1989 IMF Extended Arrangement, to the ex-
tent such proceeds are intended to be used to purchase collateral for
the Discount and Par Bonds,
(C) loans from IBRD, to the extent such proceeds are intended to be
used to purchase collateral for the Discount and Par Bonds,
(D) loans from the Export-Import Bank of Japan in the amount of
U.S. $2,050,000,000 (including interim financing relating thereto) ex-
tended in conjunction with the official credits referred to in clauses (B)
and (C) above,
(E) the 1989 Official Bridge Loan,
(F) the letters of credit issued pursuant to the Commercial Bank
Bridge Facility, and
(G) loans or advances under the Oil Contingency Revolving Credit
Agreement.
"Tangible Assets" means assets of the Borrower and Governmental
Agencies other than (i) Available Assets, (ii) gold, (iii) oil and gas and
accounts receivable deriving from the sale of oil and gas and (iv) Ac-
counts Receivable.
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